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GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS
IN MINNESOTA*

By
I.

ORViLLE

C.

PETERSONt

BASIC CoMMoN LAW PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENTAL
TORT LIABILITY

A. TiE PROBLEM
"Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he
ought to obtain justice freely and without purchase; completely and without denial; promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws."'

A

has a suit of clothes ruined without fault of his own.when
the driver of a municipal street sprinkler negligently douses
him with water in the process of filling the tank of his sprinkler.
Next day his friend B meets the same fate at the hands of the
careless driver of a street flusher. A finds he can recover from
the city for his damage; B has no such remedy.
B, driving carefully and obeying all the laws, is injured when
his car is struck by a cruising municipal police car whose driver
has just made a left turn without warning. A suffers the same
misfortune through the negligence of the driver of a street maintenance truck. B learns that the city cannot be made to pay for
his damage; A collects from the city without difficulty.
A, while walking into the office of the water department in
the city hall to pay his monthly water bill, falls because of a
defective step which the city had failed to repair. B, living in a
small village which operates no utilities at all, has the same kind
of an accident when he goes to the village hall to pay a license
*Views expressed in this study are the author's and not those of the
League of Minnesota Municipalities, with which he is associated.
iAttomey for the League of Minnesota Municipalities, Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
'Minnesota Constitution, art. L sec. 8.
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fee. A may reasonably expect to recover from the city for the
damage he suffered by his fall; B's damages go unrecompensed.
A's car is badly damaged through no fault of his own when
he strikes a long-existent hole near the curb on the right hand
side of a city street traversed by a trunk highway. B's car is
similarly damaged but the defect that caused his accident is in the
center of the street designated as a trunk highway. A gets a
judgment against the city for the damage; B finds the city is not
liable in his case and that he has no remedy against the state in
the courts.
It is small wonder that the average layman, pondering the
foregoing anomalies in the law, feels that the constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every wrong has gone unobserved in the
four illustrative cases in which governments have been held
immune from liability for the torts of their agents. 2 At any rate,
it would be difficult to convince him that there can be any rational
basis for the distinctions made by the courts in the four sets of
cases.
And with that conviction many lawyers will agree. The rational basis for the judicial distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions, 3 the general immunity of the state from
suit,4 and a host of other problems of tort liability of the state
2This is not to suggest that the constitutional provision is violated in the
eyes of the law by a holding that the state or its subdivisions are not liable
for the torts of their agents in some cases. The Minnesota court has uniformly held that the constitutional provision does not create a liability where
none existed before, but simply provides for redress in the courts for wrongs
which are recognized as such in the law. In other words art. I, sec. 8 of the
constitution creates no substantive rights. It is but declarative of the common law. See Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., (1889) 40 Minn. 117, 4 N. W.
936, 12 Am. St. Rep. 707, 3 L. R. A. 532. See the annotation on the effect
of such a constitutional provision on municipal tort liability, 57 A. L. R. 419.
3The Distinction Between Governmental and Municipal Functions of
Municipal Corporations as Applied in the Law of Torts, (1927) 75 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 555; Doddridge, The Distinction Between Governmental and
Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations, (1925) 23 Mich. L. Rev.
325; Barnett, The Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in
Tort Liability of Municipalities in Oregon, (1932) 11 Ore. L. Rev. 123;
Seasongood, Municipal Corporations-Objections to the Governmental or
Proprietary Test, (1936) 22 Va. L. Rev. 910; Should We Abandon the
Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions, (1920) 34
Harv.
4 L. Rev. 66.
Freund, Private Claims Against the State, (1893) 8 Pol. Sci. Q. 625;
Maguire, State Liability for Tort, (1916) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 20; Borchard,
Tort Liability of the State, (1930) 12 J. Comp. Leg. (3d ser.) I ; Immunity
of State Agency from Suit, (1936) 43 W. Va. L. Q. 66; Waterman, One

Hundred Years of a State's Immunity from Suit, (1936)

14 Tex. L. Rev.

135; State Liability in Tort, (1936) 22 Cor. L. Q. 87; Angell, Sovereign
Immunity-The Modern Trend, (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 150; Barry, The King
Can Do No Wrong, (1925) 11 Va. L. Rev. 349.
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and its subdivisions have increasingly engaged the attention of
legal scholars.5 With a few exceptions,0 they have generally
criticized the existing doctrines- and have proposed statutory re-

forms.8
In addition to a number of general surveys, the law of several
states recently has received special study.9 This study embraces
a similar survey of the law in Minnesota as it applies to all units
of government.

B.
1.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY

THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND THE DisTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL AND PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS

The doctrine that the state as the sovereign cannot be sued for
its torts is so firmly imbedded in the Iaw' 0 that the cases have
5
For a more comprehensive list of articles, see (1934) 20 A. B. A. J.
747, 748.
6See for example McCash, Ex Delicto Liability of Counties in Iowa,
(1924) 10 Iowa L. B. 16.
7
See especially the exhaustive studies by Professor Borchard on governmental tort liability appearing in (1924) 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229;
36 Yale L. J. 1, 757, 1039; (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 577, 734.
(1926)
8
Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, (1929) 23 Am. J. Int. L. 610;
Borchard, Governmental Responsibilities in Tort-A Proposed Statutory
Reform, (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 495; Municipal Tort Liability-A Proposal,
(1938) 23 Iova L. Rev. 392.
9McCash, Ex Delicto Liability of Counties in Iowa, (1924) 10 Iowa
L. B. 16;. Vinsell, Liabilities of Municipal Corporations in Mississippi,
(1931) 3 Miss. L. J. 298; Price, Governmental Liability for Tort in West
Virginia, (1932) 38 W. Va. L. Q. 101; David, Municipal Liability in Tort
in California, (1933) 6 So. Calif. L. Rev. 269, (1934) 7 So. Calif. L. Rev.
48, 214, 295, 372, reprinted in expanded form as a book under the title,
Municipal Liability for Tortious Acts and Omissions with Special Reference
to California (1936); Weintraub and Conford, Tort Liability of .Municipalities in New Jersey, (1934) 3 Mercer Beasley L. Rev. 142; Coleman,
Municipal Liability for Tort in Michigan, (1934) 13 Mich. S. B. J. 165;
Chattin, Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in Indiana, (1935) 10
Ind. L. J. 329; Freeman, Liability in Tort of Municipal Corporations in
Missouri, (1938) 3 Mo. L. Rev. 275; Schulz, Liability of Municipal Corporations for Torts in Pennsylvania, (1936) 40 Dick. L. Rev. 137; Barnett,
The Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Tort Liability of
Municipal Corporations in Oregon, (1932) 11 Ore. L. Rev. 123; Clarke,
Municipal Responsibility in Tort in Maryland, (1939) 3 Maryland L. Rev.
159; Hobbs, The Tort Liability of Municipalities, (1940) 27 Va. L. Rev.
126; Fordham and Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in
Louisiana, (1941) 3 La. L. Rev. 720; Fuller, Tort Liability of Municipalities
in Massachusetts, (1941) Report No. 4 of the Bureau for Research in
Municipal Government, Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration;
Weinberg, Municipal Liability for Tort in Wisconsin, a Survey, [1941]
Wis. L. Rev. 540.
'OSee Lane v. Minnesota State Agricultural Society, (1895) 62 Minn.
175, 64 N. W. 382; George v. University of Minnesota Athletic Ass'n,
(1909) 107 Minn. 424, 120 N. IV. 750; State by Benson v. Stanley, (1933)
188 Minn. 390, 247 N. W. 509; Westerson v. State, (1940) 207 Minn. 412,
291 N. W. 900.
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generally taken it for granted without discussion."' Yet the immunity of the state has never been extended fully to subordinate
units of government; and common law exceptions to the rule of
complete irresponsibility have been applied in Minnesota ever since
the earliest decisions.1 2 Cities and villages"s are as immune from
liability as the state for damages resulting from the negligence of
their servants in carrying on "governmental" functions, 14 but for
torts committed in their "corporate" or "proprietary" capacity,
they are just as liable as private corporations." Counties, towns,
and school districts, treated in the law as quasi-corporations,
generally have shared the state's immunity for their negligent
torts;" but recently the court has refused to extend this immunity
to such a quasi-corporation engaging in a purely "proprietary"
venture, 7 and to that extent has broken down the distinction
between quasi-corporations and true municipal corporations in
the field of tort liability.
2. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DISCRETIONARY AND
MINISTERIAL ACTS

In seeking to find a rational basis for determining the liability
of local governments for their torts, the court in some cases has
seized on another distinction-that between discretionary and
ministerial acts. Governments are not liable for the torts of their
agents when they are committed in the exercise of "discretionary"
powers of a legislative or judicial nature, but they are liable for
"The question has not been directly raised because the courts refuse to
entertain jurisdiction over the state as a prospective defendant.
"20'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn. 331, 33 Am. Rep. 470;
Peters v. Town of Fergus Falls, (1886) 35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W. 586; Bank
v. Brainerd School District, (1892) 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814.
"3The one borough in the state, Belle Plaine, is, for purposes of tort
liability, in exactly the same category as a village, and is included with
villages
in this study.
14 Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763.
15Keever v. City of Mankato, (1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158, 775.
The distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is treated in
greater detail, infra pp. 334-343. An exception to the rule exempting municipalities from torts committed in the discharge of governmental functions has
always been recognized in the case of streets. See infra, text at footnotes

375-388.
16Altnow v. Town of Sibley, (1883) 30 Minn. 186, 14 N. W. 877;
Thompson v. County of Polk, (1888) 38 Minn. 130, 36 N. W. 267; Bank v.
Brainerd School District, (1892) 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814. There arc,
however, exceptions to this rule. For example, for positive invasions of
private property, both counties and towns are liable. Peters v. Town of
Fergus Falls, (1886) 35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W. 586; Newman v. County of
St. Louis, (1920) 145 Minn. 129, 176 N. W. 191. See infra, text at footnotes
685-764.
17Storti
v. Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS

similar torts when purely "ministerial" duties are being performed.' 8 Just what the distinction between the two types of
acts is has never been dearly determined by the cases, as the
court has pointed out.16 Its relation to the governmental-proprietary
dichotomy is particularly obscure. Most of the cases in Minnesota
in which the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts
has figured are explainable on the basis of a four-fold rather than
a dual distinction, so that the conditions under which liability may
or may not be present in the case of negligent torts might be
charted as follows:
Typr OF FuzcTIoN

Governmental

Proprietary
and Streets

Discretionary

Not
Liable

Not
Liable

Ministerial

Not
Liable

Liable

'SLee v. City of Minneapolis, (1875) 22 Minn. 13; Kobs v. City of
Minneapolis, (1875) 22 Mim. 159; Alden v. City of Minneapolis, (1877) 24
Minn. 254; Thompson v. County of Polk, (1888) 38 Min. 130; Tate v.
City of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527; White, Negligence of Municipal
Corporations, (1920) sec. 105.
' 9 Tate v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45
Am. St. Rep. 501. The distinction has been elaborated somewhat more
fully in the decisions relating to the liability of public officers for their
torts. Since the officer enjoys no special immunity in the sphere of his
"governmental" activities, the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts is more often decisive than in the case of their employers, but
the distinction seems to be the same in both cases. The principle is explained in one fairly recent case as follows: "The liability of public officers
. . . attaches when a duty is ministerial, that is, when it is in obedience to
mandate of legal authority and the act is to be performed in a prescribed
manner, without exercise of the officers' judgment upon the propriety of the
act, and failure to perform it is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.
... Where a public officer is charged with duties which call for the exercise
of his judgment or discretion, as to its propriety or the manner in which it
is to be performed, he is not liable to an individual for damages unless
guilty of wilful wrong." Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161
Minn. 345, 348, 201 N. V. 435. The general rule imposing liability on
public officers for negligence in ministerial actions but not in discretionary
ones is well settled. Cases include Tholkes v. Decock, (1914) 125 Minn. 507,
147 N. W. 648; Bolland v. Gihlstorf, (1916) 134 Minn. 41, 158 N. W. 725;
Nelson v. Backcoc, (1933) 188 Mim. 584, 248 N. W. 49. The distinction
is now recognized in determining whether mandamus will lie to compel the
performance of a duty by a state executive officer, Cooke v. Iverson, (1909)
108 Minn. 388, 122 N. W. 251, although for a time mandamus was refused
even where a ministerial duty was involved, State v. Braden, (1889) 40
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Unfortunately, however, all the cases do not fit into so simple
a pattern, and, at best, the diagram affords only a rough rule-ofthumb in determining liability in any particular instance. In some
cases, the court seems to have used "discretionary" as if the term
were synonymous with "governmental," or the two concepts have
been otherwise confused. 20 On the whole, however, the few Minnesota cases in which the distinction between discretionary and
ministerial acts has been an important factor in determining liability for governmental torts seem to bear out the correctness of
the diagram on page 297 as a rough explanation of the general
principles. In the case of governmental functions, the classification
of discretionary and ministerial acts is academic and unimportant,
since liability is precluded in all cases of negligence when it is established that a governmental function is involved. When the exercise
of a proprietary function has occasioned the tortious injury, however, the distinction may be of some importance, since its application may result in immunity here if the tortious act is found to
be discretionary in character. It has been crucial, however, almost
only in situations involving defective plans for public works,
where the court has frequently applied the rule, based on the
distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts, that a
municipal corporation is not liable for defects in a plan although
it may be subject to liability for defects in the execution of the
plan. But even here, as is pointed out later,2 1 the fact that a defect
is in the plan itself is not always conclusive of immunity. What
Minn. 174, 41 N. W. 817. The liability of public officers, except as it indirectly affects governments, as where the latter underwrite judgments
obtained against their officers, is beyond the scope of this study. See, however, Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, (1937) 21 MINNEsOTA LAw REviEw 263; David, Tort Liability of Public Officers, (1939).
20
Thus in Claussen v. City of Luverne, (1908) 103 Minn. 491, 115
N. W. 643, where a municipal corporation was held not responsible for
damages resulting from the unlawful revocation of a liquor license, the
court stated that cities will not be held liable in damages for the manner
in which they exercise in good faith their discretionary powers of a public
or legislature or quasi-judicial character, a statement which seems to indicate
that "discretionary" acts are the same as "governmental" ones or that exemption from liability for discretionary acts extends only to those which are
performed in connection with governmental functions. And in Lamont v.
Stavanaugh, (1915) 129 Minn. 321, 152 N. W. 720, involving an action
resulting from an assault by a policeman known at the time of his appointment to be violent, the city was held not liable since it acted in its governmental and not in its proprietary capacity in appointing its officers. See
also Simmer v. City of St. Paul, (1877) 23 Minn. 408, where the court
spoke of the liability of the city for its negligence in the performance of "a
corporate, ministerial duty, such as the duty of constructing sewers," although the construction of sewers may involve both discretionary and
ministerial acts as those terms are usually applied by the courts.
21See infra, text at footnotes 638-646.
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seems to have been done, although not articulately, has been to
substitute a rule of reasonableness for the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts; the municipality is subjected to
liability when, and only when, its action is unreasonable.
And this, it is submitted, is as it should be. The difference between discretionary and ministerial action is largely one of degree.
In a democratic government no action involves absolutely uncontrolled discretion, and none is so "ministerial" that some
element of judgment is not involved. A court in applying the
traditional distinction between discretionary and ministerial action
simply draws a line at some intermediate point between the extremes marking the boundary between the two fields, holding
everything that seems to be on one side to be "discretionary" and
all on the other side to be "ministerial;" but this line of division
fluctuates with the time and with different judges.2 2 What the
court necessarily does is to inject into its opinions a test of reasonableness, which in general could be applied to the exclusion of its
discretionary-ministerial distinction. " To be sure, the latter test
has merit to the extent that the formulation of certain decisionsfor example, whether or not to pass an ordinance or to construct
a sewer system-as distinct from acting upon and executing that
determination is legislation. This is "hardly an operative fact imposing legal duties, and for the exertion of power in determining
policies it would therefore be inappropriate to predicate tort liability." 24 This is, however, the only extent to which the distinction
need be applied. Probably in practice this is all that it means in
qualified in some
this state. Elsewhere the distinction has been
25
others.
in
repudiated
wholly
and
jurisdictions
3. OTHER GENERAL CoNsiDERATioNs IN DETERmINING LIABILITY
a. Liability for Ultra Vires Acts
It is an established principle of agency law that, subject to
certain exceptions, a principal is not responsible for the torts of
his agent committed entirely outside the scope of the latter's
authority.26 Since the doctrine of respondeat superior, under which
22

Sigler, The Problem of Apparently Unguided Administrative Dis-

cretion, (1934)

19 St. Louis L.

Rev.

261, 311-312; Patterson, Ministerial

and Discretionary Official Acts, (1922) 20 Mich. L. Rev. 948.
23SThis point is developed with reference to public officers in a scholarly
article by Professor Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers,
(1937) 21 MINEsoTA LAW REvmw 263.
24Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, (1924) 34 Yale L. J. 129, 135.
25White, Negligence of Municipal Corporations, (1920) 49-50.

2
GRestatement of Agency, sec. 219. The subject is treated extensively in
ch. 7 of the Restatement.
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political subdivisions of the state are held accountable in tort for
certain wrongful actions of their officers and employees, is but
an application of the law of agency to public bodies, it is not
surprising that there should have developed in municipal law a
similar doctrine. The leading case in Minnesota is Boye v. City
of Albert Lea, 27 which involved an action for damages for flooding the plaintiff's land, the flooding being caused by defendant's
dam across the Shell Rock River. The city demurred on the
ground that the act of damming the river was ultra vires. According to its charter, the city had power "to regulate and control the
flowage of the waters of Fountain Lake in said city" the lake being
a part of the Shell Rock River. In holding that the complaint
stated a cause of action, the court announced the following principle :28
"Municipal corporations, in the execution of their corporate
powers, fall within the rule of respondeat superior when the
requisite elements of liability co-exist. To create such liability it
is fundamentally necessary that the act done which is injurious to
others must be within the scope of the corporate powers as prescribed by the charter; in other words, it must not be ultra vires
in the sense that it is not within the powers or authority of the
corporation to act in reference to it under any circumstances.
If the act complained of lies wholly outside of the general or
special powers of the corporation as conferred by its charter, the
corporation can, in no event, be liable for the acts of its officers,
for a corporation cannot be impliedly liable to a greater extent
than it could make itself liable by express corporate vote or action.
But if the wrongful act be not, in this sense, ultra vires, but is
within the scope of the powers of the municipality, and was so
done in the execution of corporate powers of a ministerial nature,
but in an improper and unlawful manner, as to injure others, it
may be the foundation of an action in tort against the corporation."
Since the act of damming the waters of the river was found to
be within the corporate powers of the city of Albert Lea, it
followed that the demurrer should have been overruled.
The rule thus stated is well established in American jurisprudence 29 and has its counterpart in the law of private corporations8 0 It has been applied only a few times in Minnesota, but
the few cases in which it has been important have been sufficient
27(1898) 74 Minn. 230, 76 N. W. 1131.
28(1898) 74 Minn. 230, 233, 76 N. W. 1131.
296 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, (2d ed. rev. 1936) sec. 2808;
43 C. J. Municipal Corporations, sec. 1711, p. 933; Gettys, Liability of
Municipal Corporations for Ultra Vires Tortious Acts, (1934) 8 Temple
L. Q.
133-144.
3
oSee note, (1923) 7 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 332.
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to illustrate the difficulty of determining when an act is primarily
ultra vires and when it is only secondarily so. In Sacks v. City of
Minneapalis3' the plaintiff sued for damages for trespass when
the city, without his consent or knowledge, condemned for street
purposes his burial lot in a Minneapolis cemetery in which five
of his children were buried, removed their bodies and buried
them in one grave in another part of the cemetery. The city had
power by charter to condemn ground in cemeteries, but the charter provision required the consent of the owner. The court held
the complaint was not demurrable; the condemnation proceedings
were within the general scope of the city's corporate powers, but
as it did not obtain the consent of the lot owner, its acts were
unauthorized and tortious. Boye v. City of Albert Lea was cited
for the proposition that to be ultra vires in the sense that the act
was not within the power or authority of the corporation, the city
must not have had power to act in reference to the matter under
any circumstances. Yet that rule, if applied, should have resulted
in a different conclusion from that reached by the court in the
earlier case of Kreger v. Bismarck Township,32 where the complaint alleged that supervisors of a town in attempting to drain
and improve a.highway dug ditches which resulted in collecting
large quantities of surface water and discharging it on the plaintiff's land. The complaint was held not to state a cause of action
because it failed to allege or show that the acts complained of
were performed by the supervisors within the scope of their
authority. The ditches may have been dug on private property
for all the complaint indicated; a town is without authority to
do that except by following the procedure of the statutes. It
appears therefore that there was authority to do the act complained of, but the power was irregularly exercised. Apparently
under the rule established later in the Boye Case, this should
have resulted in liability, but it did not.
Peterson v. City of Jor&a03 involved an action for wrongful
death alleged to have resulted from the city's negligence in failing
to provide lights and warning on approaches to a ferry which it
operated over the Minnesota River outside its boundaries. The
court examined the city's charter and determined that the city was
without authority to maintain the ferryboat at the time and place
in question and therefore, owing no duty to the plaintiff's intestate,
31(1898) 75 Mfinn. 30, 77 N. W. 563.
32(1894) 59 Minn. 3, 60 N. W. 675.
33(1917) 135 Min. 384, 160 N. W. 1026.
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it could not be held liable in the wrongful death action. This
seems inconsistent with the doctrine of Boye v. Albert Lea.
An early decision antedating the Boye Case represents another application of the general principle. It was held in Peters
v. Town of Fergus Falls34 that if the drainage work which occasioned the action was done as a means of improving the town
highway, it was within the general scope of powers of the town
and of the authority of the supervisors to act in its behalf. If, on
the other hand, it was merely for a private purpose-e.g. to drain
private land-it would be without the general scope of such powers,
and the supervisors and not the town would be liable."'
One somewhat anomalous result of the ultra vires doctrine
is that an injured individual may be worse off if the wrong conimitted is flagrant than if it is not. To put it specifically: if Minneapolis had had no authority under its charter to condemn
cemetery property and dig up graves but the council had nevertheless ordered the action taken which was taken in Sacks v. City oJ
MIVinneapols,36 the city would not have been liable at all tnder
the doctrine of Boye v. City of Albert Lea, although the employees who actually committed the tort proceeded on directions
of the city council; on the other hand, if the city acted simply
irregularly (as it actually did in the Sack Case) pursuant to charter power, the injured person would have the right to recover of
the city. And in the Boye Case, if the city council had proceeded
to build a dam without any authority whatever, the city would have
been relieved from liability.
It may have been a recognition of this situation which prompted the court to introduce some modification into the doctrine in a
series of cases which are difficult to reconcile with the others on
any logical ground.3 7 In the earliest of these cases, Schussler v.
34(1886)
35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W. 586.
35
Two fairly recent attorney general's opinions involved ultra vires
torts. In Op. A. G. 1936, No. 61, the attorney general ruled that a city was
not liable for damages resulting from the negligent operation of its snow
plow in clearing a trunk highway within the city limits because a municipality is not liable for torts committed outside the scope of its power an(
authority. A previous attorney general had ruled that if the city undertook
to keep clear of snow and ice the sidewalk on an interstate bridge which
the highway department and not the city was under obligation to maintain,
it would not be liable for the results of its negligence because it had no
duty to keep the sidewalk clear, but it would be liable if the condition
causing an injury was the result of an affirmative act on the part of the
city. Op. A. G. 1932, No. 20. If the action of the city was ultra vires in
the primary sense, as the 1936 opinion seemed to indicate, the distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance which the earlier opinion made has no
foundation in the Minnesota cases. If the action were ultra vires in the
secondary sense, there would be liability, whether the tort was the result
of mere neglect or positive action.
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Board of County Commissioners of Hennepin County," the
county board, under authority of a special act of the legislature,
had constructed a dam across the outlet of Lake Minnetonka at
Minnehaha Creek to maintain the lake level. The plaintiff, who
owned a grist mill below the dam, sued for damages. The defendant's county attorney conceded that the special law which
gave the county its only authority to construct the dam was unconstitutional. In holding the county liable, the court said:
"We may concede the general rule to be that the defendant
would not be responsible for the unauthorized and unlawful acts
of its officers, done colore officii; but when the defendant itself
expressly authorizes such act, or, when done, adopts and ratifies
it, and retains and enjoys its benefits, and persists in so doing,
it is liable in damages. . . . This is .. not a mere act of negligence of the board of county commissioners in the performance
of an official duty, but an active and affirmative tort, done under
claim of statutory authority and duty, and justified upon such
ground by defendant, and that it was performed within the scope
of the board's official duty."
In Viebahn v. Board of County Commissioners of Crow
Wing County3 9 an action was brought for damages to plaintiff's
steamboat business caused by a bridge constructed over the Mississippi River in violation of an Act of Congress prohibiting such
structures over navigable rivers. While the bridge was constructed without the express authority of the county, the county
did not repudiate the action of its officers in building it. The court
permitted the plaintiff to recover on the ground that the bridge
was a public nuisance and the plaintiff suffered special damage
enabling him to maintain the action. After pointing out that "it
is elementary that a municipality is not liable for the torts of its
officers committed outside the scope of their authority," the
court followed the Schussler Case to the effect that a county, not
having repudiated the ultra vires acts of its commissioners, is
liable for resulting damages to the same extent as though originally authorized by it. The court said:
"The law is well settled that a municipal corporation, not being liable for the ultra vires acts of its officers cannot make itself
liable by ratification, except where it had power in the first instance
36(1898) 75 Minn. 30, 77 N. W. 563.
37Schussler v. Board of Commissioners of Hennepin County. (1897)

67 inn. 412, 70 N. V. 6, 39 L. R. A. 75, 64 Am. St. Rep. 424; Viebahn v.
Board of County Commissioners of Crow Wing County, (1905) 96 Minn.
276, 104 N. W. 1089; Erickson v. County of Stearns, (1934) 190 Minn.
433, 38
252 N. AV. 219.
Decided the year before the leading case of Boye v. Albert Lea.

39(1905) 96 Mfinn. 276, 104 N. WV. 1089.
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or at the time of the ratification to authorize the acts. But in the
[Schussler] Case . . . the court apparently applied the doctrine of
ratification to the facts in that case, although it was clear that the
county could not have authorized the facts there complained of.
Without stopping to inquire whether that decision is in variance
with the
authorities, we adopt it as the law of this state in such
40
cases."1

Erickson v. County of Stearns,41 the last of this series of
somewhat similar cases, like the Schussler Case, involved a dam
built to maintain lake levels. In the Erickson Case, the major portion of the lake dammed was in Todd County. The statute authorizing county boards to build dams and maintain uniform lake
levels 42 granted such power in the case of lakes in two or more
counties only to the county in which the larger portion of the lake
was located. Hence Stearns County was without power to construct
the dam. After it had passed a resolution fixing the lake level and
authorizing the sharing of the expense of the dam with the game
and fish division of the state conservation department, the county
board learned that the higher lake level inundated plaintiff's
farm, so it had the dam cut down and eventually blown out.
In the action against the county for damages, the defendant
denied that it caused construction or that it maintained the dam.
The lower court took the view, shared by the supreme court, that
whatever the county board did in fixing the lake level and having
the dam built was ultra vires in the primary sense, and the county
might plead this fact in defense. The two earlier cases were distinguished, the Schussler Case because there the county board
in its answer asserted its right to maintain the dam, and the
Viebahn Case on the ground that there the court held that by its
demurrer the county had placed itself in the same position. Here
the county board had repudiated the agreement to share the cost
and denied in its answer that it constructed and maintained the
dam. The court held that in the absence of the doctrine of the
Schussler and Viebahn Cases, the complaint would have been demurrable and therefore the defendant did not need to go further
than it did in its answer.
Thus far the doctrine of these three cases has extended only
to the fact situations there involved, all of which involved obstructions of navigable waters. It is difficult to say whether the
40(1905)

96 Minn. 276, 279, 104 N. W. 1089. Italics are not in the

original.
41(1934) 190 Minn. 433, 252 N. "W. 219.
422 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 6588.
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principle is of more general application. If it is, it means that
the doctrine that municipalities are not liable for torts which are
ultra vires in the primary sense has no significance when the
tortious action is taken at the express direction of the legislative
body of the municipality or is later ratified by it. There is, of
course, no logical reason for limiting the principle to the tortious
obstruction of watercourses by dams or bridges. Ratification or
express authorization by the legislative authorities of the municipality should have no greater effect than in other cases of ultra
vires action. Perhaps the doctrine should not be considered to be
so limited. Furthermore, there seems to be no sound reason for
applying it to cases of positive action and refusing to apply it to
negligence in the performance of an ultra vires act-like the
failure to maintain the ferry approaches in good condition in
3
Peterson v. City of Jordan.4
If applied to all these cases, the
principle of the Schussler Case results in virtual abrogation of the
rule of Boye v. City of Albert Lea. The establishment of the principle in the Boye Case would have been unnecessary since the
ultra vires action was officially taken by the city and never repudiated.
If the municipality is not liable for the ultra vires torts of
its officers and employees, it is because they are acting as individuals and not as agents of the municipality. Consequently, the
wrong is theirs and they are liable for any damages flowing from
it." In Nelson v. Babcock45 the commissioner of highways was
held liable for depositing rock on private land while building a
trunk highway. The court said that when he deposited rock on
the part of the plaintiff's land not intended to be acquired by the
state, he clearly departed from the scope of his authority and was
therefore responsible for the trespass. It may be argued that every
trespass is beyond the scope of ari agent's authority, since he has
no authority to commit torts, and the decision was criticized for
46
that reason by the dissenting judges.
If the doctrine of Schussler v. Board of County Comn is43(1917) 135 Minn. 384, 160 N. W. 1026.
44See Nelson v. Babcock, (1933) 188 Mim. 584, 248 N. W. 49; see
also Peters v. Town of Fergus Falls, (1886) 35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W. 586.
45(1933) 188 Minn. 584, 248 N. W. 49.
46"It was plaintiff's counsels' position, and it seems to be that of the
majority, that the defendant is liable for the acts of his properly selected subordinates if they commit some tortious act outside the right of way and hence
outside of defendant's authority. There is no legal basis for such theory. If
there were, it would upset the entire exemption of public officers from
liability for the acts of their subordinates, because of course such officers
are never authorized to commit torts."
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sioners47 represents an exception to the rule of immunity for acts
ultra vires in the primary sense, as shortly afterward established
in Boye v. City of Albert Lea,'8 which made no reference to it,
it is to be hoped that the principle will be broadened to make a
municipality liable for every ultra vires act committed under
authority of those empowered to act for it or ratified by them.
It seems only just that the municipality and not the person who
suffers innocently from such a tort should be compelled to assume
the resulting burden. On the other hand the distinction between
personal and official acts should be preserved. 9
b. Servants to Whom Doctrine of Respondeat Superior Is
Applicable
1. In General. Since the doctrine of respondeat superior is
predicated on principles of agency, it is essential that before it
can be applied to charge a municipality with liability for tortious
acts, the relation of principal and agent must exist between the
municipality and the person who has committed the tort. Every
public corporation "must act through its agents, whether in the
performance of lawful or unlawful acts, and whether it possesses
limited or the most enlarged powers."50 The responsibility of the
municipality for the torts of its agents extends, where applicable
at all, not only to appointed officers, but to elected ones.51 Furthermore, the distinction between officers and employees seems to
have no relevance in the law of tort liability of municipalities;
where the doctrine of respondeat superior applies, it applies to
officers as well as to employees.5"
A municipality does not escape liability simply because its
agents are not appointed by it. Thus it has been held that the
legislature has the power to appoint officers to perform certain
specific duties for a city, such as laying out a street, and the acts
of such officers are the acts of the city in the same manner and
to the same extent as if performed by the regularly constituted
47(1897) 67 Minn. 412, 70 N. W. 6, 39 L. R. A. 75, 64 Am. St. Rep. 424.
48(1898)
74 Minn. 230, 76 N. W. 1131.
49 See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, (1925) 34 Yale L. J.
229, 256.
5OGould v. Eagle Creek School District, (1862) 7 Minn. 145. Professor
Barnett in his well-documented article, The Distinction Between Public
and Private Functions in Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in
Oregon, (1932) 11 Ore. L. Rev. 123, used this quotation from the Gould
Case in refutation of the "heretical compromise" adopted by the New York

court of appeals in Herman v. Board of Education, (1922) 234 N. Y. 196,
137 N. E.24, 25, 24 A. L. R. 1065, 1068, which held that a public corporation is liable for its own negligence though not for that of its agents.
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municipal authorities. 53 There has been some suggestion that a
city may be immune from liability if the tort is committed by an
official agency, like a board of health, which is independent of
the council ;54 but it is difficult to see any merit in this point unless
the independent agency constitutes an entirely separate corporation with powers of its own to sue and be sued. Liability in the
operation of a municipal utility, for example, certainly should
not be made to depend upon whether it is operated under the
direction of the council or is managed by an independent commission.
Some duties-notably the duty to keep streets in repair-may
be violated by a mere failure to act. Liability in such cases is not
affected by the fact that the necessity for taking action has been
caused55by some third person rather than agents of the municipality
itself.
2. Indepeident Contractors. In general if public work is contracted for by a municipality and the contractor does the work
independently of municipal control, the negligent acts of the independent contractor will not subject the municipality to liability
if they were not contemplated by the terms of the contract.50 In
such cases, the negligence of the contractor or his servants is
the negligence of the contractor alone and is not imputed to the
municipality.5 7 The test of what constitutes an independent con5
'Furnell v. City of St. Paul, (1873) 20 Minn. 117 (Gil. 101), where
the court held the city liable for the neglect of the street commissioner,
charged under the charter with the duty of keeping the streets in repair,
notwithstanding he was an elected officer.
2
5 While the court appears not to have made this specific point, numerous
cases involving both types of agents can be found. All the cases where the
tortious act is that of the council involve officers. In the numerous decisions
involving nonfeasance, such as failure to make street or sidewalk repairs,
it usually does not appear who was responsible for the defect since that is
considered wholly immaterial. The duty to repair is on the municipal corporation and a long-existent defect shows a neglect of that duty on which
liability may be predicated.
53
Daley v. City of St. Paul, (1862) 7 Minn. 390. See also Bryant v.
City of St. Paul, (1885) 33 Minn. 289, 23 N. W. 220.
54
Bryant v. City of St. Paul, (1885) 33 Minn. 289, 23 N. W. 220.
55A number of examples are given in the section on streets and sidewalks, infra, text at footnotes 621-626. For illustrative purposes, see the
earliest case of this kind, City of St. Paul v. Sietz, (1859) 3 Minn. 297
(Gil. 205). In improving a city street under contract with the city, a contractor left an obstruction in the street as a result of which the plaintiff
was injured. The city wvas held liable, though the damage was caused by an
independent contractor.
58Shute v. Princeton Township, (1894) 58 Minn. 337, 59 N. W. 1050;
Thompson v. County of Polk, (1888) 38 Minn. 130, 36 N. XV. 267.
57Shute v. Princeton Township, (1894) 58 Minn. 337, 59 N. XV. 1050.
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tractor has been frequently stated, but as with so many rules, it
has often been difficult to apply.58
The doctrine that a municipality is not liable for the negligence of its independent contractor must be sharply limited in
view of a number of other cases. If the damage is occasioned, not
by the negligence of the contractor but by the performance of the
work in the manner required by the contract, the contractor is the
agent of the city in such circumstances, and the city is liable for
injuries resulting from the' work.5" In other words, while the
municipality may not be liable for an independent wrong, such as
negligence or trespass, it is liable for damages resulting from
the carrying out of the contract in the only manner in which it
60
can be performed.
3. Work Relief Projects. Only one significant case has
reached the supreme court involving the liability of a city for
damages to third persons because of negligence of relief workers
engaged on a municipal project.8 ' Under the Emergency Relief
58"The essential element of an independent contractor is that lie may

do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the
control of his employment except as to the result of the work and not the
means by which it is accomplished. . . . The degree to which direction and
control is exercised is not so important as the manifest right to direct and
control where controversy may arise." Herron v. Coolsact Bros., (1924)
158 Minn. 522, 526-527, 198 N. W. 134. Most of the cases involving tortious
injuries to third persons are collected in 4 Dunnell's Minn. Dig. (1927) sec.
5835. The question has most frequently arisen in connection with liability
for injuries to the servants of the contractor. If the relationship is that of
independent contract, the municipality is not responsible for injuries to the
workmen of the contractor; otherwise it may be. See cases cited in 6
Dunnell's
Minn. Dig. (1927) sec. 10395.
59 Sewall v. City of St. Paul, (1874) 20 Minn. 511; Rich v. City of
Minneapolis, (1887) 37 Minn. 423, 35 N. W. 2; cf. Nelson v. McKenzieHayne Co., (1934) 192 Minn. 180, 256 N. W. 96. An extended discussion
of the liability imposed on the municipality by acts of an independent contractor in street cases has appeared in one law review, see Hepburn, The
Liability of the Municipal Corporation for the Negligent Acts of the
Independent Street Contractor, (1930) 6 Notre Dame Law, 35-77.
GoSee Nelson v. McKenzie-Hayne Co., (1934) 192 Minn. 180, 256 N. W.
96. In that case, a contractor building a trunk highway was held not liable
for nuisance in blasting, it being conceded that the contract could not be
performed without this blasting. The court said, "Our state highways are
built by the state itself, in its capacity as a sovereign. Their construction
is not merely authorized; it is directed. The highway commissioner is the
agent of the state for that purpose. . . . Once he has contracted for their
construction, it is the legal duty of the contractor to perform his contract.
Such a contract makes the contractor the agent of the state. . . . How then,
so long as he is guilty of no negligence or trespass, does lie commit a legal
wrong in performing, in the only way it can be performed, the affirmative
duty he owes the state? . . . That does not exclude liability for an inde-

pendent wrong such as negligence or trespass." Two justices dissented on
the ground that the action constituted a private nuisance for which authorization by the state was no bar to suit.
6
lHughes v. City of Duluth, (1938) 204 Minn. 1, 281 N. W. 871.
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Act of 1933, the city of Duluth was granted an allotment of funds
from the federal government for the improvement of its streets.
The contribution of the federal government to the general project
was to be in excess of $200,000 and that of the city of Duluth
slightly over $200. The work was supervised by the Duluth superintendent of maintenance, and the contributions to be available
for the prosecution of the project were paid as needed to the
deputy auditor of the city of Duluth. Upon request of the city's
superintendent of maintenance, the WPA sent men to the street
job, which was part of the project for which federal funds were
contributed. While no one could work on the job except men
sent by WPA, everyone sent did not have to be accepted or might
later be rejected by those in charge of the work.
As part of the project, some blasting had to be done, in the
course of -which a near-by house was damaged and one of its
occupants injured because of the negligence of the WPA workers. On appeal in the resulting action, the supreme court affirmed
62
a decision for the plaintiff.
The main question on appeal was whether the negligent acts
of the WPA workmen made the city liable. After reviewing the
evidence summarized here, the court held that the jury was
justified in finding that the work was being conducted by the
city and that the men sent there to perform labor were so far
under its control as to be considered, for the time being at least,
as employees of the city.
"Indeed," the court added, "the evidence would have justified
that conclusion as a matter of law. Even if these men were to be
considered as employees of the government, a conclusion which
the record wholly fails to justify, they were in the status of servants lent by their general employer to the city with their consent,
and the city was for the time being their master, for it had the
power to control which is the test of liability."0 3
The case does not decide definitely the status of WPA employees in all circumstances. In smaller municipalities throughout
the state it appears to be the practice in many cases for the WPA
to supervise the work and carry it out without any control by
municipal officials. In some of the larger places the work itself
is superintended by the appropriate municipal officer and some
discretion in accepting WPA personnel is exercised. There is less
likelihood in the former case that the municipality would be
62Hughes v. City of Duluth, (1938) 204 Min. 1, 281 N. W. 871.
63(1938) 204 Minm. 1, 3, 281 N. W. 871.
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liable for injuries to third persons suffered as a result of negligence by WPA workers on projects for which the municipal corporation acts as sponsor. Even in such cases the question of relationship between the WPA workers and the city or village will
probably be determined as a fact question by the jury. The
Hughes Case indicates that it cannot be said as a matter of law
that the municipal corporation is or is not the employer of the
WPA workers for purposes of determining liability to third persons.
Furthermore, in view of the fact that the federal government
is never liable for tortious acts of its employees, there may be
some tendency on the part of the court to extend the doctrine
of the Hughes Case in future cases so as to afford innocent third
persons a remedy for damages resulting from those acts. Just
how far this decision is intended to go may not be evident until
other cases involving more recent WPA projects, carried on
with less control by the sponsor, reach the supreme court.04
Decisions in other states seem to show that whether a municipality
is to be charged with the negligence of WPA workers depends
upon whether the worker is under the direction and control of
the municipal officials. 65
64

There have been only two other Minnesota cases involving municipal
tort liability in connection with WPA projects. In Bushnell v. City of
Duluth, (Minn. 1940) 295 N. W. 73, Duluth was held liable under the workmen's compensation act for injuries to a truck driver working under direction of a WPA foreman on a boulevard improvement project. However,
the sole question involved was whether the injury occurred while the driver,
who was substituting for his brother at the time, was sufficiently under the

control and management of the WPA foreman to charge the city with

liability under the workmen's compensation act. In Wagner v. City of
Duluth, (Minn. 1941) 300 N. W. 820, the court held that dependents of a
deceased WPA worker, fatally injured in his work, who accept compensation for his death under federal law are not precluded by provisions of the
workmen's compensation act from bringing action against a third party
(here the city) whose negligence was claimed to have caused decedent's
death. The status of the WPA worker as an employee of the city was not
involved in the Wagner Case.
65
City of Waco v. Thompson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 127 S. W. (2d)
223; Irolla v. City of New York, (1935) 155 Misc. Rep. 908, 280 N. Y. S.
873; Walter v. Everett School District, (1938) 195 Wash. 45, 79 P. (2d)
689; Stocker v. City of Richmond, (Mo. 1939) 132 S. W. (2d) 1116;
Towner v. City of Melrose, (Mass. 1940) 25 N. E. (2d) 336. See also
City of Phoenix v. Parker, (1937) 49 Ariz. 382, 67 Pac. (2d) 226; Todaro
v. City of Shreveport, (1937) 187 La. 68, 174 So. 111; Duren v. City of
Binghamton, (1939) 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 518. A note on Hughes v. City of
Duluth appearing in (1938) 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 264-268 digests most of
the cases, including those relating to workmen's compensation claims against
the city by WPA workers.
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c. The Application of General Rules of Negligence to
Municipalities
In so far as the doctrine of respondeat superior applies.to
municipal corporations, the same rules of negligence apply to
them as apply to private persons. Since these rules are not
peculiar to municipal law, there is no necessity for any extensive
review of them here. Perhaps a few brief statements will suffice.
A municipality, in carrying on functions in the performance of
which it enjoys no immunity from suit, must exercise reasonable
care in view of all the circumstances.,' Since the care required is
care commensurate with the situation, the amount necessary may
vary with the circumstances, though the standard-that of reasonable care-remains the same. Thus emergency vehicles, such as
fire departments responding to an alarm, are not required to
exercise the same care as other municipal vehides.06 A municipality is not an insurer of safety in its ordinary activities ;08 consequently, it is not required to guard against purely negligible
risks, or against improbable dangers.69 It need not guard against
an act of God; but it may be liable if its negligence combines
with an act of God to produce damage.70 If it keeps on its property, equipment which is likely to attract children, it must guard
against injury to those children even though the children must
be trespassers in order to be injured; in other words, the doctrine
of the turntable cases applies to it."1 Furthermore, the concept of
negligence "is composite and correlative, involving not only conduct with.respect to some subject matter but also a duty to the
person injured, or some class to which he belongs, of which the
72
conduct constitutes a violation."
1. Proximate Cause. The test of proximate cause, which
-See, for illustrative cases, Netzer v. Crookston City, (1894) 59 Minn.

244, 61 N. W. 21; Olson v. City of St. Paul, (1919) 141 Minn. 434, 170
N. W. 586; Power v. Village of Hibbing, (1930) 182 Minn. 66, 233 N. W.
597. A statement of the rule which is frequently cited appears in Christiansen v.
6 Chicago, St. P., etc., Ry. Co., (1896) 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. AV. 640.
'See Warren v. Mendenhall, (1899) 77 Minn. 145, 79 N. W. 661.
6SSee, for example, Netzer v. Crookston City, (1894) 59 Min. 244, 61
N. W. 21.
6
9See, for example, O'Keefe v. Dietz & City of St. Paul, (1919) 142
Minn. 445, 172 N. W- 696; Spiering v. City of Hutchinson, (1921) 150
Minn. 305, 185 N. W. 375; Tracey v. City of Minneapolis, (1932) 185
Minn. 380, 241 N. W. 390.
7OSee, for example, National Weeklies, Inc. v. Jensen, (1931) 183
Minn. 150, 235 N. W. 905.
"See, for example, Vills v. City of Cloquet, (1912) 119 Minn. 277, 138
N. W. 33.
72Boyd v. City of Duluth, (1914) 126 Minn, 33, 37, 147 N. V. 710.
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applies to municipal corporations as well as persons, is not
whether the particular injury or any injury should or could have
been anticipated but is whether there was direct causal connection
between the alleged negligent act or omission and the resulting
injury. 73 Otherwise put, the test of proximate cause is whether
the result followed in unbroken sequence from the original
wrong.7 4 Where several concurring acts or conditions of things

contribute to an accident, one of them being a wrongful act or
omission, that factor is to be regarded as the proximate cause of
the injury if the accident might reasonably have been anticipated
such act or omission and would not have occurred without
from
5
it.7

2. Joint and Several Responsibility. In determining liability
for negligence, there is, of course, no reason for applying any
different rules with respect to the commission of a tort in which
the negligence of a municipality contributes with the negligence
of another from those applied where two individuals are involved.
If the two tort feasors did not jointly conduce to the injury by
any acts either of omission or commission, a joint action is not
maintainable. 8 Thus if a city and another act as independent, not
joint tort feasors, producing divisible injuries, they may not be
joined.7 7 If there is an improper joinder, any defendant may
7

3

See, for example, Hamilton v. Vare, (1931)

184 Minn. 580, 239

N. W. 659.
74National Weeklies, Inc. v. Jensen, (1931) 183 Minn. 150, 235 N. W.
905; Dunnell's Minn. Dig. (1927) sec. 7002 and cases there cited. Among

the cases involving municipal corporations in which the question of proximate cause was involved are Pottner v. City of Minneapolis, (1889) 41

Minn. 73, 42 N. W. 784; Moore v. Townsend, (1899) 76 Minn. 64, 78
N. W. 880; Neidhardt v. City of Minneapolis, (1910) 112 Minn. 149, 127
N. W. 484; Korpi v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., (1911) 114 Minn. 525, 131
N. W. 372; Sivertson v. City of Moorhead, (1912)

119 Minn. 467, 138

N. W. 674; McDonough v. City of St. Paul, (1930) 179 Minn. 553, 230
N. W. 89; Tracey v. City of Minneapolis, (1932) 185 Minn. 380, 241
N. W. 390. Voluminous and confused, the cases are gathered in Prosser,
The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, (1936) 21 MINNESOTA LAw
REVIEW 19, discussing the "substantial factor" test proposed in these words

in Peterson v. Fulton, (1934) 192 Minn. 360, 256 N. W. 901: "The best
manner in which to determine whether a given act is the proximate cause
of a given result is to determine whether that act is a material element
or a substantial factor in the happening of that result."
76McDowell v. Village of Preston, (1908) 104 Minn. 263, 116 N. W.
470, where the principle was applied to make the village liable for damages
sustained when a horse took fright without fault of the driver at something
for which the village was not responsible, ran away, and came in contact
with an obstruction in the street which was there by the negligence of the
village.
78Trowbridge v. Forepaugh, (1869) 14 Minn. 133.
77Johnson v. City of Fairmont, (1933) 188 Minn. 451, 247 N. W. 572;
Shuster v. City of Chisholm, (1938) 203 Minn. 518, 282 N. W. 135.
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demur alone.78 However, the fact that a municipal corporation
and others do not by their joint act contribute to the plaintiff's
injury does not prevent their joinder as defendants upon a cause
of action for which each is liable because the several acts of the
defendants concur in causing the injury. 9 Thus where a contractor leaves an obstruction in a street with the express or implied knowledge of a city, both the contractor and the city may
be joined in an action as defendants by one injured as a result of
the obstruction."0
3. Contributory Negligence. It is, of course, incumbent on
the plaintiff to use ordinary or reasonable care for his own
safety under the circumstances-the same degree of care required
of the municipal corporation. Where there is no statute or rule
of law defining more fully the degree of care required in a given
case, it is ordinarily a question for the jury to determine whether
a person injured exercised ordinary care under the circumstances
shown.81 The rule cannot be more exactly stated; most of the
cases in which the question of contributory negligence has been
involved are largely concerned with the application of this very
flexible yardstick to the facts. A number of those cases are discussed later in this survey, particularly in the treatment of street
and sidewalk cases.
The doctrine that there can be no recovery if the plaintiff's own
action contributed to the injury requires, of course, that those
acts be negligent. The mere fact that the plaintiff contributed to
the injury will not prevent recovery. 2
4. Res Ipsa Loquitur. There are occasions when the very
fact that an accident happens suggests that the city must have
been negligent. In such cases, the negligence of the city need
not be proved because "the thing speaks for itself" (res ipsa
loquitur). 3 The doctrine appears to have been applied only a very
few times to municipal corporations in Minnesota. In Goar v.
Village of Stephen 4 where the plaintiff sued for damages caused
78
Trowbridge
79

v. Forepaugh, (1869) 14 Minn. 133.
Fortineyer v. National Biscuit Co., (1911) 116 Minn. 158, 133 N. W.

461.

80
Hufman v. City of Crookston, (1911) 113 Minn. 232, 129 N. W. 219;
Latell v. Cunningham, (1913) 122 Minn. 144, 142 N. W. 141; Hoffman v.
City of St Paul, (1932) 187 Minn. 320, 245 N. W. 373.
81
McGandy v. City of Marshall, (1929) 178 Mlinn. 326, 227 N. W. 177.
82
83Holm v. Village of Carver, (1893) 55 Minn. 199, 56 N. W. 826.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine should not be confused with the principle that a municipal corporation is liable irrespective of negligence when
a dangerous instrumentality kept on its premises escapes and damages private property. This kind of case is discussed, infra, text at footnotes 721-723.
84(1923) 157 finn. 228, 196 N. W. 171.
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when she was burned by a 2,300 volt current of the village's
electric distribution system while ironing, the iron being connected with ordinary 110-volt house current, the court held that
the rule of res ipsa loquitur applied and that even if plaintiff's
proof had stopped with the circumstances of the injury, there
still would have been an issue for the jury. In City Water Power
Co. v. City of Fergus Falls5 the doctrine was held applicable to
the bursting of defendant's dam.
One of the elements necessary for the application of the rule
is that the instrumentality causing the injury must be exclusively
and wholly under the control of the city. Hence it has no application to an accident occurring when the wooden cornice of a
building fell to the sidewalk and injured the plaintiff.8 The rule
also cannot be invoked where the damage is caused by some
extraordinary occurrence which could not reasonably be anticipated or guarded against and which the instrumentality was not
designed or intended to meet. Thus res ipsa loquitur has no
application to the flooding of plaintiff's premises when a municipal sewer backed up during an almost unprecedented rainfall of
5.12 inches in less than four hours.87
C. A

GENERAL SURVEY OF TIE COMMON LAW TORT LIABILITY
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1. THE STATE

The doctrine of immunity of the sovereign from suit at the
instance of an individual is so firmly imbedded in AngloAmerican jurisprudence that as a principle it needs no discussion
here.8 9 The injustice of the doctrine to injured individuals in this
era of rapidly expanding governmental services and centralization
of governmental functions is apparent; it is reflected in the fact
that the problem of immunity of the sovereign has been considered frequently by legal scholars.8 0
85(1910) 113 Minn. 33, 128 N. W. 817.
86
Heidemann v. City of Sleepy Eye, (1935)

195 Minn. 611, 264 N. W.
212. 87
Power v. Village of Hibbing, (1930) 182 Minn. 66, 233 N. W. 597.
8sThis section is designed to give a brief over-all view of the liability
of the state and each type of its political subdivisions. To some extent it
overlaps material in Part II, which embraces a functional rather than a
political division.
89
See Duhne v. New Jersey, (1920) 251 U. S. 311, 40 Sup. Ct. 154,
64 L. Ed. 280; 3 Willoughby, Constitutional Law, (2d ed. 1929), sec. 887.
9OFreund, Private Claims Against the State, (1893) 8 Pol. Sci. Q.
625; State Liability for Tort. (1916) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 20; Borchard, Tort
Liability of the State, (1930) 12 J. Comp. Leg. (3rd ser.) 1; Waterman,
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Since the courts refuse to entertain jurisdiction in cases in
which the state is sought to be made defendant, it is impossible
to find Minnesota decisions in which the doctrine of state immunity from tort suits has been thoroughly discussed or even
enunciated. However, at least one case has involved the question
of whether or not the defendant was a state agency, it being
conceded by the court without argument that if an arm of the
state were involved, the action should be dismissed.01 The plaintiff had been injured when a stand collapsed at a football game
at the University of Minnesota which he paid to attend. The
Board of Regents of the University had formed a university
council authorized to appoint a committee on athletics. The council was composed of the deans of all the faculties together with
representatives of the students and one representative of the
alumni association. The athletic committee of five members was
given supervision over Northrop field and the grandstand and
entire control over university athletics, subject to constant revision and ratification of the University council. There was also
an athletic board of control, composed of faculty members and
representatives of the students and alumni association, which
was to recommend all proposed expenditures, subject to approval
by the athletic committee. Action of the board of control was
supervised by the council committee, this in turn by the University Council, and the latter by the Board of Regents. Members
of the association could not share in receipts, the association had
no stockholders, and the sole source of revenue was from gate
receipts. The treasurer of the University was its treasurer.
In this situation the court concluded that the association and
its board was a mere agency of the University Board of Regents.
"It follows that the defendant was neither a partnership nor a
corporation or a voluntary association of individuals transacting
business. It was a' 2branch of the University and was not a proper
party defendant."
One Hundred Years of a State's Immunity from Suit, (1936) 14 Tex. L.
Rev. 135; Responsibility of the State on Contract and in Tort, (1934)
20 Va. L. Rev. 444; West, Suits Against the State or Agencies Thereof,

(1935)

3 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 371; Angell, Sovereign Immunity-The

Modern Trend, (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 150; Barry, The King Can Do No
Wrong, (1925) 11 Va. L. Rev. 349.
91
George v. University of Minnesota Athletic Ass'n, (1909) 107 Minn.
424, 120 N. IV. 750.
2
9 However, two justices dissented on the ground that the'defendant w,as
an association within the meaning of the statute, Rev. Laws 1905, sec. 4067,
permitting suits against associations. In their opinion, the University council and the athletic association were two entirely independent organizations.
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In Lane v. Minnesota State Agricultural Society93 the court
had no difficulty in overruling defendant's demurrer, which was
based on the argument that the agricultural society was a public
corporation created by the state solely for public purposes, and
was therefore entitled to share the state's immunity. The plaintiff was suing to recover for injuries sustained allegedly through
defendant's negligence when she rode a horse under agreement
with the defendant in a horse race promoted and controlled by
it. The rule of immunity applying to state-created public corporations was thus stated:
". .. When the state creates public corporations solely for
governmental purposes, such corporations, while engaged in the
discharge of the duties imposed upon them for the sole benefit
of the public and from the performance of which they derive no
compensation or benefit in their corporate capacity, are clothed
with the immunities and privileges of the state; and no private
action, in the absence of an express statute to that effect, can be
maintained against them for negligence in the discharge of such
duties." 4
Since the state cannot be sued without its consent, a private
landowner who finds his land taken by the state without coinpensation has no action at law for damages against the state9"
even though the constitution specifically forbids the taking or
damaging of property for public use without compensation." Two
recent cases reveal one technique evolved by the court to give the
aggrieved landowner an indirect right of action for damages in
a limited class of condemnation cases.
State, by Benson v. Erickson7 involved a petition by the
state to condemn property for highway purposes. The respondent
had no interest in the land covered by the proceedings, but she
claimed that certain of her lots in the village of Blackduck were
That surplus funds were used in improving the state's property was con-

sidered immaterial, as was the fact that the Board of Regents had authority

to abolish athletics entirely. The case involves mainly the interpretation of
various facts, but the dissenting opinion is interesting because it illustrates
the frequent effort of the court, or some of its members, to mitigate the

rigor of the sovereign immunity doctrine wherever its application can be
avoided without undermining the principle itself.
93(1895) 62 Minn. 175, 64 N. W. 382.
94(1895) 62 Minn. 175, 177, 64 N. W. 382. It is mainly on the ground
that counties, towns and school districts, are held to be involuntarilycreated branches of the state discharging purely public functions that these
quasi-corporations have shared the state's immunity in large degree. See
infra, pp. 323-330.
95

See State by Benson v. Stanley, (1933) 188 Minn. 390, 247 N. W. 509.
98Minnesota, Constitution, art. 1, sec. 13.

97(1931) 185 Minn. 60, 239 N W. 908.
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adversely affected by the change of grade ordered as part of the
project. The lower court, over objection, granted her application
to be made a party respondent and on appeal after the commissioners had awarded her no damages, gave her $2,000. The supreme
court on appeal reversed the judgment. It said :'
"The commissioner's order rerouting a highway is merely a
preliminary step which establishes public authority and determines the necessity of acquisition by condemnation or otherwise.
It forms no more a part of the condemnation proceedings than it
would if a definite final designation of location had been written
into the constitution. It justifies condemnation proceedings in
case the easements designated are not acquired by purchase, but
it did not authorize or justify an enlargement by the court of
the subsequent proceedings to include the respondent's lots.
"If the highway commissioner's determination is conclusive
on the necessity of taking, his determination is likewise conclusive
on what property he will not take or damage and on what property he will not cause to be included in the condemnation; and
the court may not enter his province for the purpose of compelling him to include in condemnation proceedings lands or
interests which he has determined not to condemn. It must leave
property owners to their legal or equitable remedies to protect
invaded rights."
Three justices dissented on the ground that the determination
of damages in condemnation cases is not a legislative question,
and that under "the constitutional guaranty against taking or
damaging property for public use without compensation
"neither the legislature nor any branch of the government
under legislative authority can arbitrarily take or damage private
property for public use without compensation nor arbitrarily fix
compensation or deny compensation."' 9
Less than fifteen months later, the court was faced with a
similar situation. The state had laid out a portion of Trunk
Highway No. 7 in Waseca County. Part of one man's land was
included in the condemnation proceedings, but he had one forty
which was flooded by the carrying out of the highway plan. This
forty was not covered by the proceedings. Claiming he should
have damages for the flooding, he moved to have this land included
in the condemnation proceedings. At first the lower court granted
his motion, but when its attention was called to the Etickson
Case, the order was reversed. On appeal, however, the supreme
court decided that the landowner's motion should have been
98(1931) 185 Minn. 60, 63, 239 N. W. 908.
99(1931) 185 Minn. 60, 67, 239 N. W. 908.
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granted, and the conflicting portion of the Erickson decision was
overruled. 00 In the course of the opinion, the court said, 10 1
"The showing at the present time is that the state planned
and constructed a trunk highway west from Waseca 15 miles and
included in the condemnation proceedings lands which it thought
necessary, and is making use of defendant's 40, for which it made
no compensation. It was proper to include this 40 and to award
damages. The state invoked the jurisdiction of the district court
to acquire the right of way for the general road project. If the
condemnor had been a railroad or a municipality the defendant
would have had a remedy by suit for damages or by injunction.
Here he has no remedy by suit for damage. . . Since the state
has chosen to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in the establishment of a comprehensive trunk highway and has chosen to
use and damage the defendant's 40 without condemning it, we
hold that the landowner may intervene by motion in the condemnation proceeding and that the court may say to the state that
it must bring the land of the defendant, concededly taken and
damaged, into the proceeding for the assessment of compensation. And this seems almost a necessary result of the constitutional
provisions mentioned. 10 2 The state cannot, with decent regard for
the due process of law provision, and the provision giving everybody a remedy for wrong done his property, and the special provision against the taking of property for public use without coinpensation, leave out property which it uses or damages in a public
project and prevent the owner from having compensation, all
because it cannot be sued. If in going west from Waseca the state
had left a mile gap in the highway uncondemned but used and
then resisted the powers of the court to decree compensation to
its owner, its position would be more startling but little different."
In spite of such occasional efforts to give an injured person a
'0oState, by Benson, v. Stanley, (1933) 188 Minn. 390, 247 N. W. 509.
There had been no change in court personnel in the fifteen month interval.
One wonders how much the earlier decision was influenced by the fact,
alluded to by the court, that the aggrieved landowner in that case had a
cause of action against the village for damages for change of grade if the
village assented to the change as required by the statute. In the Stanley
Case, the trunk highway involved was outside municipal limits, where the
element of county consent to the highway plan, and consequently the basis
for liability against the county, was absent.
101(1933)
188 Minn. 390, 393, 247 N. W. 509.
102
The court had cited art. 1, sec. 7, the due process clause, art. 1, sec.
8, the clause giving every person a remedy for injuries or wrongs, and art.
1, sec. 13, forbidding the taking of private property for public use without
compensation. To what extent art. 1, sec. 8 figured in the decision is conjectural, though it is probable that the court would have reached the same
result without it. If the court intended to construe it as requiring the giving
of a remedy here where there would have been no remedy otherwise, the construction is at odds with other decisions. So construed, the provision might
require the court to allow a landowner whose land has been damaged by
the state to maintain an action for damages independently of the condemnation proceedings. This the Stanley Case itself recognizes cannot be done.
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remedy against the state, and except for the right to invoke the
use of equity writs and to bring suits against state officers for
their wrongful actions, the rule that the state cannot be made
amenable to suit in the courts for torts committed by its agents
remains undisturbed and unchallenged.
In fields where state action is taken concurrently with or
impinges upon action by its subdivisions, the contrasting rules
of immunity applying to the state and municipal corporations
may result in peculiar situations. This is most striking, perhaps,
in the case of trunk highways within municipal limits. The
10 3
Babcock highway amendment to the Minnesota constitution
omits all reference to streets within municipal corporations, and
it states nothing about the width of trunk highways or the portion of municipal streets designated as trunk highways which
the state is obligated to maintain. At first, trunk highways did not
extend into the limits of the three first class cities,104 but in
1933 the legislature extended them through these municipalities. 0 5 Trunk highways within municipalities are now all constructed and maintained by the state except in Minneapolis, St.
Paul and Duluth, where the cities maintain them and receive an
agreed sum per mile from the state as partial reimbursement. 00
But the statutes are indefinite as to the portion of trunk highway streets which the state must maintain.10 7 Customarily the
highway department maintains the highways within municipalities to the same width as its highways just outside (usually 18
or 20 feet), the width being designated in a "width order" when
the trunk highway is designated. 08 Obviously this dual nature of
a municipal street as a trunk highway and a local street has created many problems of jurisdiction and responsibility; few of
these have been settled by statute or judicial decision. It has been
determined that the local communities are not responsible for
maintenance of the center portion, the trunk highway proper, and
consequently are not liable for accidents resulting from a defective condition of this part of the street.10 9 The result is that it
may be of crucial importance to the driver of an automobile
103Art. XVI.
104innesota constitution art. XVI, sec. 1.
' 05 Laws 1933, ch. 440.
1083 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sec. 2557.
0

' oSee 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 2554, subdivs. 3, 4, sec. 2557.
'009sSee 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 2554, subdivs. 3, 4.
1 Lundstrom v. Giacomo, (1935) 194 Minn. 624, 261 N. W. 465. See
Automatic Signal Advertising Co. v. Babcock, (1926) 156 Minn. 415, 208
N. W. 132.
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injured because of the defective condition of a trunk highway
street whether the defect is in the center portion or within a
lane the duty to maintain which devolves on the city. If the
accident happens in the trunk highway proper, the driver has no
judicial remedy because the state cannot be sued and the municipality owes no legal duty to maintain it; if the accident happens
outside the 18 or 20 foot strip in the center, the driver may sue
the city or village, unless the state has designated the whole
width between curbs as a trunk highway. 10 Thus the state has
taken over the municipality's maintenance responsibilities as to
the trunk highway, and has virtually monopolized the taxation of
motor vehicles and the sale of gasoline to support it and the
rural portions of the trunk highway system,"' but has never
assumed the municipality's liability to travelers for failure properly to discharge its duties of maintenance." 2
In one field of trunk highway construction, a municipality may
be liable though its only responsibility is the approval of highway
department plans. Under the statutes"12 the consent of the city
or village is necessary before the highway commissioner may
proceed to make a change of grade on a trunk highway within a
municipality. When this consent is given the municipality is liable
for resulting damages. 114 The only way the city or village can
protect itself is by withholding consent until the commissioner
of highways agrees to reimburse it for the damages, or to have
the damages determined in a proceeding brought by the state."'
"1OLundstrom v. Giacomo, (1935) 194 Minn. 624, 261 N. W. 465.
"'Constitution art. 9, sec. 5; art. 16, sec. 3.
11Incidentally, the highway department's powers over traffic problems
on trunk highways within municipal limits appear to be broader than its
maintenance duties. Laws 1937, ch. 464, as amended by Laws 1939, ch. 430.
1131 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 2554, subdiv. 3.
114Maguire v. Village of Crosby, (1929) 178 Minn. 144, 226 N. W.
398; Foss v. City of Montevideo, (1929) 178 Minn. 430, 227 N. W. 357.
In the Maguire Case the court said,

"

. . . the wrong which gives the

right of action was in authorizing the same when no provision was first
made to pay or secure compensation for the damages plaintiff's property
sustained. If it was a wrong to appropriate plaintiff's property or damage
the same for public use, all who participated in the wrong are liable."
Maguire v. Village of Crosby, (1929) 178 Minn. 144, 146, 226 N. W. 398.
Of course, the last sentence should not be construed broadly enough to
permit suit against the state; on the contrary the court expressly stated,
"We know of no way by which the property owner injured could sue the
state direct." Idem, p. 149.
"'The Maguire Case suggests this possibility. The court pointed out
that the legislature may have contemplated that both parties might be so
interested in the project that agreements between them could be made in
connection with claims such as this one. 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.,
sec. 2557, providing for construction and maintenance agreements with

reference to trunk highways in cities, was believed to look in that direction.
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It does not necessarily follow that because a wronged individual has no cause of action against the state, he is without a
remedy. He may have a remedy against the officer or employee
who commits the tort. The liability of a public officer who fails
to perform a duty imposed on him by law is well settled in this
state. It attaches when the duty. is ministerial and when the act
is one designed for the benefit of the individual injured and
to whom the performance of the duty is due."16 There is no
liability, however, for mere nonfeasance as distinguished from
misfeasance ;117 hence this remedy would not be available for
injuries due to the negligent state of repair of trunk highways,
although street defects probably still occasion the largest number
of injuries in the case of municipalities.
It has been recognized that such state officers as the commissioner of highways are not personally liable for the consequences of their official acts done within the scope of their
authority,"8s at least unless they were not only unnecessary but
were done corruptly or maliciously. 1 9 Some distinction appears to
have been made, however, between such acts and positive invasions of private property made in connection with official acts
such as the building of highways. In such cases the officer is
held liable on the theory that the trespass is outside the scope
of his authority.' 20 But this appears to be a somewhat tenuous
argument since all torts-at least all wilful torts-committed by
public officers are in the same sense outside the scope of their
2
authority. '
Not only is the highway commissioner not liable in the construction and maintenance of a trunk highway to those injured
by defects in the highway due to his negligence or the negligence
of his subordinates or employees,'12 2 but he is also not liable for
consequential damages to adjacent landowners due to faulty or
negligent plans of construction. 2
6

3

Furthermore, he is liable for

" Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 201
N. W. 435; see Tholkes v. Decock, (1914) 125 Minn. 507, 147 N. W. 648.
"'See Bolland v. Gihlstorf, (1916) 134 Minn. 41, 158 N. W. 725;
Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 201 N. W. 435.
"'sNelson v. Babcock, (1933) 188 Minn. 584, 248 N. AV. 49.
" Wilbrecht v. Babcock, (1930) 179 Minn. 263, 228 N. W. 916 and
cases 20there cited.
1 Nelson v. Babcock, (1933) 188 Minn. 584, 248 N. W. 49.
1"-'The legislature evidently regarded the decision in Nelson v. Babcock as unjust, for it reimbursed the highway commissioner for the amount
of the judgment plus attorney's fees. Laws 1933, cl. 390, sec. 6.
"2Nelson v. Babcock, (1933) 188 Minn. 584, 248 N. NV. 49.
123 Wilbrecht v. Babcock, (1930) 179 Minn. 263, 228 N. W. 916.
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the acts of his subordinates in cases where he would be liable for
connected with the
his own acts only where he is sufficiently
124
action so that it can be considered his.
For state officials who are required to furnish a bond to insure
the faithful performance of their duties, such as the highway
commissioner and his immediate subordinates, 125 the right to sue
the officer may be a fairly adequate substitute for the right to sue
the state itself in the limited cases where the officer is liable for his
official acts. In most cases, however, the financial irresponsibility
of the individual concerned makes the right to sue the officer of
dubious value. 12
The harshness of the rule forbidding suit against the state or
its agencies is also somewhat tempered by permitting some meas-

ure of judicial control over official actions by mandamus and injunction. It is well recognized that even state officials may be

required by mandamus to perform strictly ministerial duties definitely prescribed by law 12 7 and may be prevented by injunction
124See Nelson v. Babcock, (1933) 188 Minn. 584, 248 N. W. 49.
1251 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 2553, Subdivs. 3, 4. "The state,
the several governmental subdivisions thereof, or any person damaged by
any wrongful act or omission of said commissioner of highways in the
performance of his official duties may maintain an action on such bond for
the recovery of damages so sustained." See also 3 Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stats., 1940 Supp., secs. 9677-1, 9677-2, providing for fidelity bonds of
other officials and employees. The latter statute does not state the condition of the bonds other than that they be for the faithful discharge of
duties.
the officer's
126 The foregoing brief analysis of the liability of the officers of the
state for their official torts does not purport to be exhaustive or critical.
The liability of officers for thieir acts is a tremendous field in itself and is
beyond the scope of this study except through incidental treatment. Consult
Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, (1937) 21 MINNESOTA
LAW RFvIEW 263; David, Tort Liability of Public Officers, (1939) 12 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 127-154, reprinted with other material in 1940 as Publication
16 of the Public Administration Service, Chicago.
No. Sp.
127Cooke v. Iverson, (1909) 108 Minn. 388, 122 N. W. 251, where the
earlier cases are reviewed. Of course, mandamus will not lie to control
administrative officers in the performance of discretionary acts. See, in
addition to the cases cited in the Iverson Case, State ex rel. Burnquist v.
District Court, (1918) 141 Minn. 1, 168 N. W. 634; State ex rel. Early v.
Wunderlich, (1920) 144 Minn. 368, 175 N. W. 677; State ex rel. Security
State Bank v. District Court, (1921) 150 Minn. 498, 185 N. W. 1019;
and Cook v. Trovatten, (1937) 200 Minn. 221, 274 N. W. 165, which while
not involving mandamus actions, suggest the general principle applicable.
The distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts in mandamus
cases involving executive officers was first mentioned in Chamberlain v
Sibley, (1860) 4 Minn. 228 (Gil. 309) ; but it was later disapproved in
Rice v. Austin, (1872) 19 Minn. 74 (Gil. 103), 118 Am. Rep. 330, where it was
held that the judicial department could not control the executive even as to
ministerial acts. The distinction was reestablished in Cooke v. Iverson,
(1909) 108 Minn. 388, 122 N. W. 251. In the application of this principle
there is no substantial difference between the governor and other members

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS

in a limited class of cases from performing wrongful or negligent
ministerial acts under color of official position or authority.2B It
has been conceded that this remedy is available to prevent a
change of grade without compensation first being paid or secured, 129 though on another occasion the court seemed to think
there might be a question about the right of a landowner to an
injunction when his land was being damaged by the highway
commissioner without its having been joined in a condemnation
proceeding. 30 It has been held, too, that one whose home is being
damaged by blasting in connection with highway construction
cannot enjoin the public work which occasions it so long as the
consequential damage caused by the blasting cannot be avoided.23
In that case the plaintiff, over the vigorous protest of two dissenting judges, was left without judicial remedy in spite of the
constitutional prohibition against damaging property for public
use without compensation 32 Even in cases where injunction
wil lie, the remedy may not be a practicable one because in most
cases the person injured by a tort committed by a state officer
has no way of knoying it will be committed. In other ways injunction has a limited use. It would hardly lie, for' example, to prevent continuance of a state of disrepair on a public highwvay.
Taking everything into consideration, it is evident that the
immunity of the sovereign from suit still operates effectively to
prevent any real redress to an individual for torts committed by
agents of the state in the performance of their official duties.
Remedies by injunction or mandamus, or by suit against the officer concerned, have only limited availability, and even where the
courts permit their use, they may be impracticable.
2. COUNTIES, TOWNS, AND ScHoOL DisTrICts
In determining tort liability, the courts frequently have made
a distinction between true municipal corporations (i.e. cities, vilof the executive department; in either case immunity from judicial direction depends upon the nature of the act to be performed. State ex rel.
Kinsella
v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 133 N. W. 857.
2

' sSee School District No. 1 v. Lindhe, (1935)

195 Minn. 14, 261

N. W. 486 and the cases cited in State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911)

116 Minn. 313, 133 N. W. 857; consult (1921) 6 MINEsfrA LAw REmw
80, (1923) 8 MxNESOrA LAw REvIw 62; 32 C. J. Injunctions, sec. 383,
pp. 240-241,
sec. 384, pp. 242-243.
29

' 1faguire v. Village of Crosby, (1929) 178 Minn. 144, 226 N. W.
398; State, by Benson v. Erickson, (1931) 185 Minn. 60, 239 N. W. 908.
'"°State, By Benson v. Stanley, (1933) 188 Minn. 390, 247 N. AV. 509.

23'Nelson v. McKenzie-Hayne Co., (1934) 192
96; see (1935) 19 MItNESOTA LAw REmw 130.
'"sMinnesota, constitution art. 1, sec. 13.

mi. 180, 256 N. AV.
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lages, and boroughs) and quasi corporations (i.e. counties, towns,
and school districts). The latter receive no charter from the state;
they are involuntary agencies formed for purely public purpose,
and therefore they are not liable for their torts unless expressly
provided by statute.13 The basis for the immunity of quasi municipal corporations from suit was stated in Altnow v. Town of Sibley1 34 which involved an action for damages resulting from a

defective condition of a town road:
"The ground upon which the exemption from liability is usually placed is substantially this: A town is a quasi and public corporation only, and, as such, a part of the government of the state.
The duties enjoined upon it by law are enjoined upon it as a part
of government, and not otherwise. They are, therefore, public in
nature; that is to say, they are duties to the state, and not to private persons. Hence, a breach of one of them creates a liability
to the state only,-a public liability,-on account of which an
offending town may be amenable to a public action by indictment.
This is the general rule. Exceptions may, of course, be made by
statute, so that, in addition to or in place of the public liability, a
town may be subjected to a private action for damages."
Similar quotations may be found in a number of other Minnesota cases.'3 From them it would appear to be the established
133Dosdall v. County of Olmsted, (1882) 30 Minn. 96, 14 N. W. 458;
Bank v. Brainerd School District, (1892) 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814;
Altnow v. Town of Sibley, (1883) 30 Minn. 186, 14 N. W. 877; and
numerous other cases. See Kneier, Legal Nature and Status of the American County, (1930) 14 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 141, 148-155. Professor
Kneier states that from the principle that cities are not liable in tort where
the officers are engaged in governmental functions, courts reason that since
the county performs, as an agent of the state, only governmental functions,
there can be no liability on its part; but historically the development has
been in the other direction. See Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction
Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common Law
Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, (1937) 16 Ore. L. Rev. 250.
1:4(1883) 30 Minn. 186, 189, 14 N. W. 877.
135Compare the statement of the distinction between municipal and
quasi-municipal corporations given in Commissioners of Hamilton County v.
Mighels, (1857) 7 Ohio St. 109 and quoted extensively in Kneier, Legal
Nature and Status of the American County, (1930) 14 MINNFSOTA LAW
REviEw 141, 142. In that case the court emphasized the fact that "municipal
corporations proper are called into existence, either at the direct solicitation
or by the free consent of the people who compose them." However, quasi
corporations like counties are "local subdivisions of a state, created by the
sovereign power of the state, of its own sovereign will without the particular solicitation, consent or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them.
The former organization is asked for, or at least assented to by the people
it embraces; the latter is superimposed by a sovereign and paramount authority. A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for the interest,
advantage, and convenience of the locality and its people; a county is
created almost exclusively with a view of the policy of the state at
large, for purposes of political organization and civil administration, in
matters of finance, of education, of provision for the poor, of military or-
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rule that quasi corporations 3 ' are not liable for their torts except
as liability is expressly imposed by statute. This is, however, too
broad a statement; rather the cases seem to support the proposition that except for negligence in the maintenance, of highways,
quasi corporations are subject to the same rules of tort liability
as are cities and villages.
Almost as soon as the relatively complete immunity of quasi
corporations for their torts had been established in Almtow v.
Town of Sibley, an exception was introduced. In Peters v. Toiwn
of Fergus Falls 37 it was held that the duty to keep highways in
repair puts the town in the possession and control of them for
this purpose and gives it a qualified or special property in the
land over which they run.
"It stands, so far as respects adjacent property, in the position
of owner.... The right to cause damage to adjacent lands in the
town's management and control of the highway, beyond that
which a private owner may, without liability, cause to the lands
of others by acts done on his own land, must be acquired through
the right of eminent domain."' 3'
That a quasi-municipal corporation is liable as an owner of property for tortious damage to abutting property is now settled lav
in this state, not only with respect to towns, 39 but also with
respect to counties 40 and school districts."4 Since quasi corporations are liable for damage caused to adjacent lands for which a
private owner would likewise be liable if caused by acts done by
him on his own land, they have been held answerable for damages
caused by surface water,"12 and by sand and dirt placed in a
ganization, of the means of travel and transport, and especially for the
general administration of justice. With scarcely an exception, all the powers

and functions of the county organization have a direct and exclusive reference to the general policy of the state, and are, in fact, but a branch of
the general administration of that policy."
136References to quasi corporations throughout this study are meant to
include counties, towns, and school districts. As appears subsequently in the
text, the same principles apply to all three in this state.
'37(1886) 35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W. 586.
138(1886) 35 Minn. 549, 551, 29 N. W. 586.
' 3 9Township of Blakely v. Devine, (1886) 36 Minn. 53, 29 N. W. 342;

Oftelie v. Town of Hammond, (1899) 78 Minn. 275, 80 N. W. 1123; Gunnerus v. Town of Spring Prairie, (1904) 91 Minn. 473, 98 N. W. 340,
974; Koeper v. Town of Louisville, (1908) 106 Minn. 269, 118 N. W.
1025; Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny, (1922) 153 Minn. 11, 189 N. W. 439;
Sandmeier v. Town of St. James, (1925) 165 Minn. 34, 205 N. W. 634.
"4Lindstrom v. County of Ramsey, (1917) 136 Minn. 46, 161 N. V.
222; Newman
v. County of St. Louis, (1920) 145 Minn. 129, 176 N. AV. 191.
' 41Bohrer v. Village of Inver Grove, (1926) 166 Minn. 336, 207 N. V.
721. ' 4-Peters
2
v. Town of Fergus Falls, (1886) 35 Minn.
549, 29 N. V. 586;
Township of Blakely v. Devine, (1886) 36 Minn. 53, 29 N. W. 342; Oftelie
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natural water way and washed onto private land. 14 3 A town has

been held liable for damages from quack grass cast upon private
land in the course of improving a town road 44 and a county for
damages from fire started in burning brush on the highway and
spread to adjacent land.' 45
It is difficult to see any real basis for a distinction between
this type of case and other torts where quasi-municipal corporations have been held not liable. If the reason for the exemption
in the latter cases is that the counties, towns, and school districts
perform purely public functions, acting as agents of the state,
the reason applies as well to liability for torts of nuisance and
trespass committed against property adjoining their highways
or other property. 4 6 The fact is that the Minnesota court, like
the courts of other jurisdictions, has been much more prone to
protect private property from invasion by municipal and quasi corporations than it has to protect persons from injuries.
Notwithstanding this liability where the county or town is
in the position of a landowner in its duties to adjacent property,
it has always been the rule that such municipal quasi corporations are not liable to the public for damages sustained as a result
4
of their failure properly to maintain their highways.1 7 In this

v. Town of Hammond, (1899) 78 Minn. 275, 80 N. W. 1123; Gunncrus v.
Town of Spring Prairie, (1904) 91 Minn. 473, 98 N. W. 340, 974; Koeper v.
Town of Louisville, (1908) 106 Minn. 269, 118 N. W. 1025; Lindstrom v.
County of Ramsey, (1917) 136 Minn. 46, 161 N. W. 222; Sandmcier
v. Town of St. James, (1925) 165 Minn. 34, 205 N. W. 634; see Felepe
v. Towns of America and Cedarbend, (1928) 174 Minn. 317, 219 N. W.
158. However, a county board has no proprietary interest in the land over
which a drainage ditch is laid and it therefore is not liable for damages
caused by surface water diverted by a county ditch. Defiel v. County of
Clay, (1926) 169 Minn. 79, 210 N. W. 626.
143Bohrer v. Village of Inver Grove, (1926) 166 Minn. 336, 207 N. W.
721. 4
145Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny, (1922) 153 Minn. 11, 189 N. W. 439.
'4 Newman v. County of St. Louis, (1920) 145 Minn. 129, 176 N. W.
191.

14GThis criticism of the cases imposing liability on quasi corporations
as landowners has been occasionally made by other courts. Thus in O'Brien
v. Rockingham County, (1923) 80 N. H. 522, 120 At. 254, decisions like
those in Minnesota were questioned on the ground that if counties and
other quasi corporations were liable in such cases, it established liability
of the state itself. "But the state can no more be stied for injuries caused
by its own negligence or that of its servants or agents or for the results of
a nuisance maintained on its land than it can be for a breach of its promise
to pay for service rendered or money loaned."
147Counties: see Nickelsen v. Mpls., N. & S. Ry., (1926) 168 Minn.
118, 209 N. W. 646 and Austin v. Village of Tonka Bay, (1915) 130 Minn.
359, 153 N. W. 738; towns: Altnow v. Town of Sibley, (1883) 30 Minn.
186, 14 N. W. 877; Weltsch v. Town of Stark, (1896) 65 Minn. 5, 67
N. W. 648 and see Zacharias v. Nesbitt, (1921) 150 Minn. 368, 185 N. W.
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respect, they are different from cities and villages, which have
always been held liable for damages resulting from their negligence in the maintenance of streets.148 This may be the only
field of tort liability in which quasi corporations enjoy an immunity not shared by municipal corporations, but the difference
is highly important, because street and sidewalk defects have given
rise to the largest number of cases against cities and villages.
The authorities of the various states are in conflict on the
proposition of liability of town officers for negligence in the
discharge of their function of keeping town roads in repair.
The Minnesota court has adopted the proposition that town officers are exempt from liability for failure to repair roads."
However, they apparently may be liable for damages resulting from
their positive misfeasance in making repairs. 150 Even in the latter
case, liability extends only to the negligent discharge of ministerial
functions.' 51
Before the recent significant case of Storti v. Town ol
Fayal,'5 ' it could not have been said that except for street maintenance'there -was little difference between the tort liability of
municipal corporations and counties, towns, and school districts.
That case, however, went a long way in erasing any differences
(aside from the exception just mentioned) between the two types
of political subdivisions of the state.
The town of Fayal operated a telephone system for the benefit of its inhabitants as authorized by statute.Y53 The plaintiff
was injured by one of the telephone wires which was lying across
a trunk highway, and he brought action against the town for
damages. On appeal the order overruling the town's demurrer
was sustained.
Before this time the governmental-proprietary criterion had
no appreciable application to towns, but if it had been understood that towns were not liable for damages resulting from negligence in the exercise of proprietary functions, that idea was
295. School districts, of course, have no general road maintenance func-

tions, but if they had, they doubtless would enjoy the same immunity as
towns and counties.
14slnfra, text at footnote 375 et seq.
149Bolland v. Gihlstorf, (1916) 134 Minn. 41, 158 N. W. 725; Stevens v.
North States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 201 N. AV. 435.

15OTholkes
v. Decock, (1914) 125 Minn. 507, 147 N. \V. 648.
5
5'Tholkes v. Decock, (1914) 125 Minn. 507, 147 N. V. 648; see also
Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 201 N. W. 435.
152(1935)
194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
153Minnesota, L~.vs 1921, ch. 439, 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats. sees.
5312-5316.
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dispelled by the Storti decision. Previously no case had reached
the supreme court in which a county, school district, or town had
been engaged in a function which the court would call proprietary
were it being performed by a strictly municipal corporation.
Whether or not the Storti Case intended any real change in the
law, it does make it clear that towns, like cities, operate'in a dual
capacity so far as tort liability is concerned. To put the ruling in
154
the court's own words,
". .. there is no logical or sound reason, under our statutes
and decisions, to apply any different test to towns than to other
municipal corporations as to liability for negligence in the performance of permissive nongovernmental functions."
It is likely that with the expansion of services which counties
and towns are permitted to render, other cases will arise where the
distinction between proprietary and governmental functions will
be applied to quasi municipal corporations. Counties are now permitted to build and maintain hospitals'5 and airports.5 0 Certain
counties may construct and maintain sewers ;15 T others, public
bathing beaches.' 58 Towns may operate airports' 59 and certain
towns may build sewerage systems' 60 and a waterworks. 10 7 Counties, towns, and school districts now may operate recreational programs independently or in conjunction with other units.'
In
Minnesota the operation of parks and recreational activities is
considered a governmental function;1063 but if Minnesota were in
line with a number of other states holding to the contrary, towns
and school districts carrying on recreational programs under the
statutory enabling authority soon might find themselves in another field in which liability was imposed for their negligence.
In at least one other state the criterion of determining the liability
of municipal corporations has been extended in this way. The
New York court of appeals has held that a town, having been
granted power by the legislature to maintain parks, should be
held liable on the same principle as a city to one who sustains
"54 Storti v. Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 634, 261 N. W. 463.
1-551 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., secs. 677-682; 4588.

1'63 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., secs. 5494-38 to 54941-45.
1573 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.. 1940 Supp., sec. 669-19 et seq.
"58 Idem, sec. 10278-3 et seq.; I Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sees. 756-5,
756-6.
1593 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sees. 5494-37, 5494-39
to 5494-45.
0
16
Idem, sec 1108-31 et seq.
1
'G
6 Idem, sec. 1027-6.
' -Laws 1937, ch. 233, 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sec.
1933-9a et seq.
163Infra, text at footnote 281.
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injuries because of the negligent maintenance of a swimming
pool, and that the town in assuming any duty of a proprietary
nature must be held also to assume the burdens that go with it."
As a matter of fact, some of the language of earlier Minnesota cases indicates that counties, towns, and school districts had
escaped liability generally until the Storti Case only because the
functions in which they were engaging were those which even
when performed by municipal corporations are considered governmental. Thus in Weltsch. v. Town of Stark, 65 where the court

held a town not liable for injuries due to a defective highway, it
was stated to be the rule that
"no private action, unless given by statute, lies against a town
or other municipal or quasi-municipal corporation for either the
nonperformance or negligent performance of any public duty
imposed on it by general statute as a governmental agent, without its request, and from performance of which it derives no
profit."
And in Bang v. Independent School District,0 8 the court held a

school district not liable for its negligence as a result of which
one of its teachers contracted tuberculosis. The court said that
the district in maintaining a school building, conducting a school,
and supervising the teaching force "exercises governmental as
distinguished from proprietary functions." In another case 0 7 the
court pointed out that a school district "is an agency for the
public good. Its function is to administer public education and [it]
is a quasi governmental agency. It is an arm of the state and its
functions are governmental."
This view that the rule of Storti v. Town of Fayal is not a
new one is supported by the fact that in the cases in which counties, towns, and school districts have escaped liability, except in
the maintenance of roads where the liability of municipal corporations has been admitted to be an exception to the usual
criterion of immunity, 6 ' a municipal corporation performing the
same function also would have been held immune from liability.
Thus a county is not liable for damages resulting from the negligent maintenance of its court house;"" neither is a city in mainl64Augustine

v. Town of Brant, (1928) 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732;

see Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, (1932) 19 Va.
L. Rev. 97-120, esp. 101.
165(1896) 65 Minn. 5, 67 N. W. 648.
266(1929)
177 Minn. 454, 225 N. W. 449.
67
1 Allen v. Independent School District No. 17, (1927)
173 Minn. 5,
216 N. W. 533.
l6SSee infra, text at footnotes, 390-400.
169 Dosdall v. County of Olmsted, (1882) 30 Minn. 96, 14 N. W. 458.
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taining its municipal hall." 0 A school district is not liable for

injuries sustained on a school playground;"' neither is a city
for similar injuries in its parks.' 7 2 A school district is not respon-

sible for tuberculosis contracted by a teacher as a result of its
negligent failure to fumigate.' 73 Almost certainly a city would
not be liable under similar circumstances. The school function
is most like that of a municipal library, for negligence in the
operation of which a city is probably not liable. A school district
is not liable for injuries suffered as a result of negligence of a
school bus driver ;174 there probably is no real parallel in city
government, but no reason is evident why a city would be held
liable were it to carry on the same function. By statute the school
district's immunity has been preserved if it organizes school
safety patrols, 75 but the statute clearly adds nothing to what
would have been the rule in its absence; and even if the school
safety patrol is organized under the city police department by
ordinance, as has been done in a few municipalities, such as St.
Paul, the immunity granted to cities and villages in their police
work would doubtless extend to work of this character.
3. CITIES, VILLAGES, AND BOROUGHS
It is apparent from what has been said that there have been
relatively few cases in which the tort liability of quasi-municipal
corporations in Minnesota has been before our high court, and
consequently there are many gaps in the law still to be filled. The
court has far oftener been called on to determine the responsibility of strictly municipal corporations for their torts. As a result
the principles applying to them can be filled in in considerably
greater detail than in the case of quasi-municipal corporations,
where a summary of the law amounts to hardly more than a rough
sketch. It is not difficult to understand why this should be true.
In the first place, as has already been indicated, quasi-municipal
corporations are concerned almost entirely with functions which
are so clearly "governmental" or "public" in character that their
performance would not produce liability even if they had been
entrusted to cities and villages. Schools discharge only one func170Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763.
"'Bank v. Brainerd School District, (1892) 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W.
814.

"'7Emmons v. City of Virginia,
1'3Bang v. Independent School
N. W. 449.
174Allen v. Independent School
216 N. W. 533.
1753 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.,

(1922) 152 Minn. 295, 188 N. W. 561.
District, (1929) 177 Minn. 454, 225
District No. 17, (1927)
1940 Supp., sec. 2883-5.

173 Minn. 5.
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tion, education; counties are concerned with law enforcement,
the administration of justice, road construction and maintenance,
and welfare activities; towns occupy themselves largely with
highway work and, in about 27 counties in the state, with the
relief of the poor. To the extent that municipal corporations engage in similar work they, too, are exempt from liability-with
one exception. That exception:--the maintenance of streets-accounts for far more litigation than all the other tort cases combined. In the second place, cities and villages are empowered to
carry on many more activities than are quasi-municipal corporations, and some of these functions are carried on for profit. Since
the basic distinction between governmental and proprietary func-

tions seems always to have existed in this state, there has always
been a possibility for recovery in a particular case until there
had been a judicial determination of the fact that the function
involved was a governmental one.
It is of course in the field of municipal corporations that the

traditional

distinction between

governmental and proprietary

functions has had its fullest sway. In line with the courts of nearly every other state, 17 6 the Minnesota court has held cities and villages immune from suit for negligence when they are engaged

in discharging governmental functions and subject to liability
f or similar negligence when a proprietary function is involved.
The maintenance of streets is a governmental function, but in
TT
this case liability has been imposed since the earliest decisionsI
although the failure to extend immunity in this case is admittedly anomalous. 7 s In addition, liability is imposed in all other
instances where counties, towns, and school districts are liable,
namely where the municipal corporation violates a duty as landowner owed to adjacent property 79
6
17 South Carolina has refused to make the distinction and has held
municipal corporations in the absence of statute immune from suit even in
the case of proprietary functions. Irvine v. City of Greenwood, (1911)
89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228. Florida has held commission cities liable even for
neglige-nce in the performance of what are ordinarily classed as governmental activities. Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, (1922) 84 Fla. 634, 94
So. 697. Ohio once made a significant departure from the immunity doctrine
in the case of fire departments, Fowler v. City of Cleveland, (1919) 100
Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72; but the case was later overruled. Aldrich v. City
of Youngstown, (1922) 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164.
'7-Shartley v. City of Minneapolis, (1871) 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284);
see City of St. Paul v. Ruby, (1863) 8 Minn. 154 (Gil. 125).
'78 See Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 472, 53 N. W.
763. 79
:1 0'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn. 331; Dyer v. City of
St. Paul, (1881) 27 Minn. 457, 8 N. W. 272. The numerous surface water
cases are discussed, infra, text at footnotes 724-764.
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4.

SPECIAL DISTRICTS

Minnesota has not had the experience with independent governmental subdivisions formed for special purposes that many
states have had. There has been for a long time authority to establish drainage districts, 180 but these are without corporate existence; they are simply ad hoc districts created solely for the purpose of constructing ditches to drain wet lands.1 8 1 The cost of

ditch construction has been paid for by special assessments levied
against benefited land, but the district has had no other taxing
powers, any permanent government, or any powers save the
maintenance of the ditches. Since damages to property incurred
because of a diversion of surface water are assessed before the
ditch is constructed, there is little occasion for the commission
18
by these "districts" of torts later which give rise to law suits. 2
In 1933 the legislature established the Minneapolis-St. Paul
Sanitary District to construct and maintain a sewage treatment
plant for the Twin Cities metropolitan area.1sza The governmentalproprietary test apparently applies to the torts of this district to
the same exent as it does to a municipal corporation.sb
There are numerous statutes authorizing the creation of independent boards in municipalities to administer particular functions like parks 8 3 and utilities. 8 4 Generally, however, these boards
are not given the status of an independent governmental unit.
Like the park board in Minneapolis, they are agencies of the city
government and may not be sued separately.185 Consequently, the
exercising of a function by an independent board creates the same
liability on the part of the city as if it were performed by a department more amenable to council control. At least one law,
however, authorizes cities of the fourth class after vote of the
people to create a park district with quite independent powers, in1801 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., ch. 44.

81
There are apparently no existing "drainage and conservancy districts" or "drainage and flood control districts" as authorized by statute.
Anderson, Local Government and Finance in Minnesota, (1935) 332.
182As to the liability of drainage districts to actions for damages generally,8 see a note in 11 Va. L. Rev. 564 (1925).
l 2aMinnesota, Laws 1933, ch. 341, incorporated in Mason's 1940 Supp.
sees. 1607-8 to 1607-30.
1s2bSee Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District, (1938) 201
Minn. 622, 277 N. W. 208. The district does not share the immunity of the
state. Jones v. Al Johnson Construction Co., (Minn. 1941) 300 N. W. 447.
1831 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sees. 1255-1262; 1731-1734; 1868-1873.
1841 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., secs. 1852 to 1860.
x85Webber v. Board of Park Commissioners of City of Minneapolis,
(1900) 80 Minn. 55, 82 N. W. 1119.
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cluding the power to sue and be sued and to hold title to park
property. 86 The statute contains this interesting language:","All claims against the park district arising out of negligence
shall be in writing and verified by the claimant, and shall obtain
[sic] a full, dear and concise statement of the transaction out
of which it is alleged to arise, giving time, place, extent of injury' or damage, and shall be filed within thirty days from the
date thereof with the clerk of the board. No action shall be maintained unless begun after thirty days and within six months from
the date of the filing of the claim."
The law may nowhere have been put into operation, but if it
has, the court has never been called upon to construe it. It is not
likely that the provision relating to claims "arising out of negligence" would be interpreted as creating any liability where none
would otherwise exist. It has been determined that parkways in
parks, if negligently maintained, may give rise to a cause of
18
action for damages in the same manner as ordinary city streets.2
The application of the statutory provision would probably be
restricted to such cases and, following the analogy of the cases
construing the statute allowing suits against school districts "for
injuries to the rights of the plaintiff," would not permit recovery
for negligence in the operation of parks.
One unique statute, which may not be in use, provides for
the creation of a private corporation for the purpose of acquiring
and managing parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities
in any city of the second, third, or fourth class.1 89 The city is
authorized to transfer park, playgrounds or pleasure drives to
00
the corporation and a reconveyance may be made at any time.
The law is interesting for present purposes because it specifically
exempts the corporation from all liability for want of repair in
the park or playground property.2 1 The corporation thus escapes
a liability for negligence in the maintenance of parkways which
the city has to assume when they are under its jurisdiction.192
1861 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1740.
1871

Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1743. The language is comparable

to that used in the general statute, 1 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1831,

requiring the service of notice of tort claims before suit.
'5 5 Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, (1903) 90 Minn. 158, 95 N. V. 908.
lsMminnesota, Laws 1929, ch. 209, 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940
Supp., sec. 7902-7ff.
1903 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sec. 7902-7.
1913 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp. see. 7902-11.
192

1dem, sec. 7902-11 requires the placing of signs on pleasure drives

reading, "Any person using this drive does so at his own risk as to defects

therein."
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I.

THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES TO SPECIFIC TORTS
AND SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS

D. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL
PROPRIETARY

AND

FUNCTIONS

The ordinary rules of negligence-what
proximate cause, contributory negligence,
the like-have no distinctive manifestations
pal liability for negligence, but one rule

constitutes negligence,
res ipsa loquitur and
in the field of municifor determining tort

liability is peculiar to municipal law: the doctrine that municipal
corporations are not liable for negligence in the discharge of governmental functions but are liable for such negligence if incidental
to the performance of proprietary functions. This test is still
the touchstone of liability in the municipal field; and if a city
is found to be exercising a governmental duty when a negligent
tort occurs, questions of proximate cause and contributory negligence need not be considered. As will appear later, the governmental-proprietary test is somewhat limited in its application to
other torts;193 but in the case of negligence, its sway is almost
complete." 4 This test, while simple of statement, has been exceedingly difficult to apply; and it has been severely criticized both
on theoretical and practical grounds.199 The limits of each type
of functions are vague and uncertain; and confusion has been
worse confounded by a loose use of terminology. The term "governmental" has been used in the decisions'
interchangeably with
"93The municipality is liable for positive invasions of private property
and for maintaining a nuisance of certain kinds, apparently whether performed in a public or private capacity. Infra, section I. In other fields than
torts, the distinction between the governmental and proprietary capacity of
a municipal corporation is not so generally observed. Seasongood, Municipal
Corporations-Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, (1936)
22 Va. L. Rev. 9M0-944. It has no application, for example, to the field of
public contracts, except in determining the period for which a contract may
be validly made, see Reed v. City of Anoka, (1902) 85 Minn. 294, 88 N. W.
981 ; and it does not apply to the determination of exemption of municipallyowned property from property taxation. See Anoka County v. City of St.
Paul, (1935) 194 Minn. 554, 261 N. W. 588; but see In re Delinquent
Taxes of Polk County, (1931) 182 Minn. 437, 234 N. W. 691.
194 The functions of sewer and street maintenance are always treated for
purposes of tort liability as if they were proprietary and are sometimes
called such. See McLeod v. City of Duluth, (1928) 174 Minn. 184; 218
N. W. 892.
"95Supra, note 3.
l9GSnider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763;
Miller v. City of Minneapolis, (1898) 75 Minn. 131, 77 N. W. 788; Hoppe
v. City of Winona, (1911) 113 Minn. 252, 129 N. W. 577; McLeod v.
City of Duluth, (1928) 174 Minn. 184, 218 N. W. 892; Borwege v, City
of Owatonna, (1933) 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915.
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"public,"'197 "police,"' 9 8 and even "administrative;" ' 094"proprietary" has been used 2 0 synonymously with "corporate," 20' "private," 20 2 "corporate ministerial,"2 0 3 "corporate proprietary,""'
been used
and "nongovernmental.."20 5 The term "municipal" 2 0has
20 6 but governmental. 7
to mean not only proprietary
The development of the doctrine of immunity of municipal
corporations from liability for negligence in the performance of
governmental functions and the maintenance of streets is difficult to trace, and scholars have differed somewhat in their explanations. 208 The doctrine is generally understood to have its
.
roots in old English cases, notably Russell v. lIen of Devan209
It was adopted first as an American principle in Mower v. I nhabitants of Leiceste, 2 10 and has been subsequently followed, usually
without any attempt at critical analysis. So far as its adoption in
this country is concerned, the rule appears to be based on a misconception. The basis of the decision in Russell v. Men of De"von
was that the inhabitants of the county were not a corporation,
and had no corporate fund out of which a judgment could be
satisfied. This was true. An English county was not a corporation and had no power of taxation. Its inhabitants had no
v. City of St Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763";
' 9 -Snider
Miller v. City of Minneapolis, (1898) 75 Minn. 131, 77 N. W. 788.
v. G. N. Ry. Co. (1912) 117 Minn. 348, 135 N. W\. 1129.
'gsErickson
9
106, 51 N. W. 814.
19
2 Bank v. Brainerd School District, (1892) 49 Minn.
0OHoppe v. City of Winona, (1911) 113 Minn. 252, 129 N. W. 577;
Snider
2 v. City of St Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763.
01Grube v. City of St. Paul, (1886) 34 M£inn. 402, 26 N. \V. 228;
Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763; Ihk v.
Duluth City, (1894) 58 Minn. 182, 59 N. W. 960; McLeod v. City of
Duluth, (1928) 174 Minn. 184, 218 N. W. 892. The term "corporate" has
frequently been used in a broader sense to refer to any power granted by
charter. In this sense, the word designates both governmental and proprietary functions.
2o2Snider v. City of St Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763;
McLeod v. City of Duluth, (1928) 174 Minn. 184, 218 N. \V. 892.
2o3Simmer v. City of St. Paul, (1877) 23 Minn. 408.
20
4Borwege v. City of Owatonna, (1933) 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915.
-oStorti v. Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
206
Grube v. City of St. Paul, (1886) 34 Minn. 402, 26 N. W. 228;
Thompson v. County of Polk, (1888) 38 Minn. 130, 36 N. WV.267; Ihk v.
Duluth City, (1894) 58 Minn. 182, 59 N. W. 960; Hoppev. City of
(1911) 113 Minn. 252, 129 N. \V. 577.
Winona,
07
- zleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, (1904) 93 Minn. 118, 100 N. W.
669. 0
-. sBarnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and.
Private Functions in Respect to the Common Law Tort Liability of
Municipal Corporations, (1937) 16 Ore. L. Rev. 250; Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, (1926) 36 Yale L. J. 1, (1927) 757, 1039;
David, Municipal Liability for Tortious Acts and Omissions, esp. pp. 13-45.
209(1788) 2 Durn. & E. 667.
210(1812) 9 Mass. 247.
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authority to repair the bridge whose defective condition caused
the injuries which gave rise to the suit or to raise money with
which to do it. Those reasons, of course, do not exist in this
country. Counties, towns, school districts, cities, and villages all
have the power to sue and be sued in this state2 1' and to levy
taxes 21 2 including taxes to pay judgments.2 1 3 As a matter of fact,
the first American case in which the English doctrine was applied
involved a county; but the principle was later extended on the
authority of Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester to cities and villages without question.2 1 4 Whatever the origin of the distinction,
it has from the first been accepted as part of American jurisprudence by the Minnesota court,2" which has made no attempt
to trace its development or investigate its soundness. It is now
far too well accepted to be changed drastically except through

legislation.
While the court has not attempted a critical analysis of the
doctrine, it has stated it on innumerable occasions. The general
idea underlying the decisions is that in carrying on certain duties
-termed governmental-a municipality acts as an agency of the
state. Since it discharges these duties for the benefit of all, it
shares the immunity of the state, for which it is acting."O These
2111 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., secs. 638, 999, 1117, 3098,
2121 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., see. 2060 et seq.
211 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1108, 1836, 3100. Any of these
units21may issue bonds to pay judgments. Idem, see. 1942.
4Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and
Private Functions in Respect to the Common Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, (1937) 16 Ore. L. Rev. 250. A note in (1920) 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 66 entitled, Should We Abandon the Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions, explains the basis for the doctrine in the
rules applying to early common law actions. "No action on the case lay by
a private individual against a town for the omission to perform a public
duty, but the proper procedure was by way of indictment. [Cf. Altnow v.
Town of Sibley, (1896) 65 Minn. 5, 67 N. W. 648.1 Tile lack of private
action was later placed upon the ground that towns were usually not corporate and so could not be sued. And still later recovery was denied because of the long-established common-law rule."
21!Cf. 6 MeQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936), see.
2772, p. 1010; "There seems to have been no time when such [cities and
villages]

. . . were wholly free from responsibility for torts, or civil

wrongs, by the common law. In the present condition of this special branch
of the law, the liability or non-liability rests not so much on principle as
from the life and development of the law of municipal corporations which,
as frequently appears, is more or less complex and abstruse. Furthermore,
such liability is either created, or modified to a great extent, by written law,
either constitutional or statutory, and hence, oftentimes the liability or nonliability turns upon the true interpretation of the applicable written law."
216Lane v. Minnesota State Agricultural Society, (1895) 62 Mim. 175,
64 N. W. 382; Hall v. City of Austin. (1898) 73 Minn. 134, 75 N. W.
1121; Hoppe v. City of Winona, (1911) 113 Minn. 252, 129 N. W. 577:
Allen v. Independent School District No. 17, (1927) 173 Minn. 5, 216
N. W. 533.
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duties are imposed on municipal corporations by the state for
public good and they, as corporations, receive no benefit from
them.2 17 Conversely, to be "proprietary," a duty must relate to
the local or special interests of the municipality.215
The argument that in discharging governmental functions, a
municipal corporation is virtually an arm of the state and is therefore entitled to share the state's immunity from suit is open to
criticism. The state is immune because it cannot be sued. Municipal
corporations in this state and elsewhere usually can be sued and are
amenable to process. Courts have adequate jurisdiction over municipal corporations; they have no jurisdiction over the state.: 19
As has been stated by the United States Supreme Court, howit is to say that the state is sovereign and therefore
ever
cannotcorrect
be sued without its consent, "the subordinate legislative
powers of a munidipal character which have been or may be
lodged in the city corporations-do not make these bodies sovereign., 20
Blended with the notion that the municipality is an instrumentality of the sovereign when performing duties for the benefit
of all is the idea that the officers and employees of the municipality
when so acting are not agents of the municipality and therefore
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.2 2' But this
argument is not reconcilable with the principle of agency law that
the character of the service performed is immaterial, the important
factors being the extent of control which the employer has over the
2

iThompson v. County of Polk, (1888) 38 Minn. 130, 36 N. W. 267;
Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763; 'McDevitt
v. City of St. Paul, (1896) 66 Minn. 14, 68 N. V. 178; Roerig v. Houghton,
(1919) 144 Minn. 231, 175 N. W. 542; Storti v. Town of Fa)al, (1935)
194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
218lbk v. Duluth City, (1894) 58 Minn. 182, 59 N. NV. 960. The court
called this "the most reasonable and satisfactory test." but it is doubtful
whether it is of any real help in determining the character of a particular
"proprietary."
function.
219 One has said virtually as much when lie has said
Harno, Tori Immunity of Municipal Corporations, (1921) 4 I1.
L. Q. 28, 31.
-21Ofetropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, (1889) 132
U. S. 1, 9, 10 Sup. Ct. 19, 33 L. ed. 231. The United States Supreme Court
has laid down the rule in admiralty that a city is responsible for the negligence of its agents in the operation of a fireboat on its way to aid in
extinguishing a fire. Workman v. New York City, (1900) 179 U. S. 552,
21 Sup. Ct 212, 45 L. Ed. 314. The function of fire fighting has almost
uniformly been held to be governmental.
22Cf. Ihk v. Duluth City, (1894) 58 Minn. 182, 59 X. W. 960; Hall v.
City of Austin, (1898) 73 Minn. 134, 75 N. W. 1121. This idea has been
stated more fully by other courts. See Freedman, Liability in Tort of
Municipal Corporations in Missouri, (1938) 3 Afo. L. Rev. 275, 277;
Clarke, Municipal Responsibility in Tort in Maryland, (1939) 3 Md. L.
Rev. 159, 162.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

employee in the matter of wages, duration of employment, manner of execution of the work, and the like. 22 2 So far as these mat-

ters are concerned there seems to be no substantial difference
between governmental and proprietary powers.
As a corollary or as a concomitant of the general idea that
the municipality is but an agent of the state in discharging governmental duties, it is argued that in performing functions of
this character, the municipality and its officers and employees
owe a duty to the state only and not to private individuals; therefore, in case of negligence there is no breach of duty on which a
private individual can base his action. 3 On the other hand when
it goes into a proprietary venture, it assumes such a duty to
private individuals. 22 4 It is difficult to tell from the cases whether
the function is public because no duty is owed to private individuals or whether no duty is owed to private individuals because the function is public. That there is an obligation to the
public alone apparently does not provide an additional test to
2 25
determine the governmental nature of the function.
22
In Storti v. Town of Fayal, the court applied another test,
though the rest of the opinion indicated that the same result would
have been reached had this additional criterion been ignored. The
rule there applied is that where a mandatory duty is imposed on
a municipality, the performance of that duty is a governmental
function. The function involved was found to be permissive and
not mandatory. 227 The same distinction appears to have been in
222
Restatement of Agency, sees. 12-14; 2 Mechem, Agency (2d ed.
1914) sec. 1863. See Woodruff v. Town of Glendale, (1877) 23 Minn. 537;
"It is true that, by our statute, the power spoken of is conferred uJ)on the
supervisors; but this fact only goes to establish the liability of their town
for their official acts, for the supervisors are town supervisors---officers and
agents of a town. What they do as supervisors they do for their town; and,
upon general principles of the law of agency, the town is responsible for their
official
223 acts."
Altnow v. Town of Sibley, (1883) 30 Minn. 186, 14 N. W. 877;
Weltsch v. Town of Stark, (1896) 65 Minn. 5, 67 N. W. 648; Claussen v.
City of Luverne, (1908) 103 Minn. 491, 115 N. W. 643; cf. Stevens v. North
States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 201 N. W. 435. For the elements
of a cause of action for negligence, see Restatement of Torts, sec. 281.
In the Claussen Case the Court said, "The exemption is based upon the
sovereign character of the state and its agencies, and upon the absence of
obligations,
and not on the ground that no remedy has been provided."
224
Brantman v. City of Canby, (1912) 119 Minn. 396, 138 N. W. 671.
225
See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, (1924) 34 Yale L. J.
129, 136: "The fact is that all functions performed by a municipality are
for the public benefit, otherwise they could hardly be undertaken with public
funds or by public officers."

226(1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
227(1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463. The function spoken of was

a town telephone system.
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the court's mind in several other cases. The mandatory character
of governmental functions is evident in their being "imposed"223
and in the references to quasi municipal corporations as "involuntary corporations."229 Such functions are given to a town
"without its request.

2 30

If the question of whether a particular duty is mandatory or
permissive is important in determining the governmental or proprietary character of a particular function, that test has never
been consistently applied. It is clear that a municipality may function governmentally in matters left optional to it as well as in
those imposed by law. 23 1 Numerous small villages have no fire
department as a municipal enterprise; yet if one is established,
the municipality is not responsible for its negligence. 22 Furthermore, it has been held that there is no distinction in i'innesota
between mandatory and permissive functions of school districts ; 3
and though the case of Storti v. Town of Fayal made such a distinction in the case of towns, it found no inconsistency with
the school district case. Thus, while mandatory duties have generally been held to be governmental,2 3 4 far from all permissive
functions have been held to be proprietary. One case, Miller v.
235
in holding that a city is under no obligation
City of St. Paul,
to light its streets and that mere neglect to do so is not a ground
of liability unless the charter expressly imposes the duty seems
to be completely at variance with the mandatory-permissive test as
often applied, if the italicized portion is an essential part of the
statement.
That duties have been imposed by law rather than assumed
has generally been considered evidence of their governmental character.2 3' But the voluntary assumption of a duty is not generally
22 sSupra, note 217.
229
Gaare v. Board of County Commissioners of Clay County, (1903)
90 Minn. 530, 97 N. W. 422.
23oWeltsch v. Town of Stark, (1896) 65 Minn. 5, 67 N. W. 648.
23
'Emmons v. City of Virginia, (1922) 152 Minn. 295, 188 N. IV.
561.
232Grube v. City of St. Paul, (1886) 34 Minn. 402, 26 N. XV. 228.
233Mokovich v. Independent School District No. 22, (1929) 177 Minn.
446, 225 N. W. 292.
234
The maintenance of streets and sidewalks is an exception; but the
rule that municipal corporations are liable for defects in their streets is
so anomalous that no tests can be applied to it which fit other situations.
235(1888) 38 Mfinn. 134, 36 N. IV. 271.
2
36Barnett, The Distinction Betveen Public and Private Functions in
Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in Oregon, (1932) 11 Ore. L. Rev.
123; Note, (1920) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 66.
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the basis of tort liability ;2"7 and because the distinction seems
238
so illogical it has been abandoned in some jurisdictions.
The more closely functions performed by municipalities have
approximated those usually performed by private business, the
easier it has been for the courts to apply the vague and shadowy
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions. Consequently, the courts have searched for the attributes of private
business when confronted with a negligence case involving municipal corporations. In particular, they have looked to see whether
or not the activity in which the municipality was engaging when
the injury occurred was being operated for profit. Frequent statements of the distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions have coupled the absence of profit or pecuniary benefit
and the idea of benefit to the public as a whole as being indicative
of the governmental character of a function.2 39 The .fact that a
particular activity produces a net profit has been consistently
held to be conclusive of the proprietary character of the enterprise ;240 and it now appears that the test is to be applied as
much to quasi municipal corporations as to municipal corporations
proper.2 41 The charging of a small fee is not sufficient to produce
liability where the activity is otherwise governmental in character. 4 2 While the absence of profit is not necessarily determinative,
237 Burdick, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1926) 131-2; (1920) 34 Harv. L.
Rev. 66, 68.
22 8
Tindley v. Salem, (1884) 137 Mass. 171, 175, 50 Am. Rep. 289, 293;
Bolster, Admr., v. City of Lawrence, (1917) 225 Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722.
See Moulton v. City of Fargo, (1918) 39 N. D. 502, 510, 167 N. W. 717:
"There is no good reason why a liability to a private action should be
imposed when a municipality voluntarily entered upon such a beneficial
work and to withhold it when it performs the service under the request of
an imperative law." See also 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed.
rev. 1936) 777-778; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, (1924) 34
Yale L. J. 135.
239Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763;
Lane v. Minnesota State Agricultural Society, (1895) 62 Minn. 175, 64
N. W. 382; Weltsch v. Town of Stark, (1896) 65 Minn. 5, 67 N. W. 648;
McDevitt v. City of St. Paul, (1896) 66 Minn. 14, 68 N. W. 178; Roerig
v. Houghton, (1919) 144 Minn. 231, 175 N. W. 542; Allen v. Independent
School District No. 17, (1927) 173 Minn. 5, 216 N. W. 533.
24OKeever v. City of Mankato, (1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158,
775; Hoppe v. City of Mankato, (1911) 113 Minn. 252, 129 N. W. 577;
Brantman v. City of Canby, (1912) 119 Minn. 396, 138 N. W. 671; Borwege
v. City of Owatonna, (1933) 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915; Storti v.
Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
241Storti v. Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. Wf. 463.
24 2
Mokovich v. Independent School District No. 22, (1929) 177 Minn.
446, 225 N. W. 292; St. John v. City of St. Paul, (1929) 179 Minn. 12,
228 N. W. 170.
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the fact that a service is furnished free to all citizens is indicative
43
of its governmental character.
The profit test is stated in the leading case of Keener v. City
of Mankato,2 4" where the court held a city liable for a death from
polluted city water. The court said:
"The city operates the waterworks for profit in the sense that
it is voluntarily engaged in the same business which, when conducted by private persons, is operated for profit. The city itself
makes a reasonable and varying charge. The undertaking is partly
commercial. It is enough that the city is in a profit making business. The city is exercising a special privilege for its own benefit
and advantage, n6twithstanding a portion of the water is used by
the city245for protection against fire and in promoting the public
health.'
Like all the other tests 'used by the courts to determine whether
an activity is proprietary or governmerital, the existence or nonexistence of the profit motive is not an entirely satisfactory
criterion, but it has provided a better yardstick than most and
has been more consistently applied. It is, however, open to objecti6n on theoretical grounds. 248 Tort responsibility is seldom
tested by the benefit derived from the act by the tort feasor. 2 T
Furthermore municipal utility charges or the prices imposed on
liquor sold in a municipal liquor dispensary are, like taxes, used
as a part of the general scheme of raising revenues with which to
carry on municipal services. If there is any net profit, it goes
to benefit the general taxpayer by lessening the burden of taxation. It is regular practice for a number of Minnesota cities
which operate their own electric generating or distribution system to transfer a portion of the earnings of the systems to the
general fund of the city for municipal use.2 18 In the 170 villages
2
43This point is stressed in Emmons v. City of Virginia, (1922) 152
Minn. 295, 188 N. W. 561; but the fact that the same conclusion was
reached later with respect to the same function (parks) where a fee was
charged, St. John v. City of St.Paul, (1929) 179 Minn.12, 228 N. NV. 170,
indicates that it is not to be considered decisive.
2 (1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158, 775.
245(1910) 113 Minn. 54, 62, 129 N. W. 158, 775.
246
Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, (1921) 4 Ill.
L. Q. 28, 32; Barnett, The Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in Oregon, (1932) 11
Ore. L. Rev. 123, 149; Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in
Tort, (1932) 19 Va.. L. Rev. 97, 104; Should We Abantion the Distinction
Between Governmental and Proprietary Function, (1920) 34 Harv. L.
Rev.2466,
7 68.
0ne example is the liability in tort that may go with the negligent
performance of gratuitous service for another. See Restatement of Torts,
sec. 2323.
48Borak and Blakey, Fees and Other Non-Tax Revenues, pp. 62-68;
Borak, Public Contribution of Municipally Owned Electric Utilities Corn-
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and cities which operate their own liquor dispensaries, profit and
a use of at least a portion of the net revenues for general mnunicipal purposes appear to be all but universal. 2 "'
It is apparent from what has been said that no single test will
satisfactorily explain the cases, even ignoring those relating to
liability for defective streets and sewers. The results are somewhat explainable by applying a historical test-is the activity one
which governments usually have performed? If it is, it should
be classed as governmental; if it is not, it is proprietary.2 0 Obviously this cannot be carried too far. It was not until 1819 that the
first municipal police force was established in London, but police
protection has almost uniformly been held to be governmental in
character. Streets have been from ancient times the responsibility
of governments; but their maintenance has been classed in this
state and many others as if they were proprietary. Swimming
pools have been, at least until recently, as frequently private as
public; but they have been classed in this state as governmental.
It is not difficult to apply the tenuous distinction between governmental and proprietary functions to such clearly defined functions as utility operation and health activities, blit in the twilight
zone of parks, hospitals and similar activities in which the general
welfare is involved, the courts have found consistency a jewel
beyond their reach. It is not difficult to understand why this is so.
When a new activity is before a court for classification, it finds
itself motivated by conflicting forces. On the one hand is the
increasing recognition that certain functions, like health, formerly
considered local in character, are of vital interest to the state as
a whole; on the other is the growing realization, in the face of
rapidly expanding governmental services, of the need for extending municipal tort liability.25 1 Both these forces have had to
struggle with precedents already established. Sometimes a court
has had to make refined distinctions between what are essentially
pared with Taxes of Private Utilities in Minnesota, (1937) 22 Minnesota
Municipalities 267-278.
249Recently, the following sample municipalities reported these earnings
through their newspapers or annual financial statement; Baudette (1939),
$6,600; Bemidji, (1940), $35,978; Columbia Heights, (1939), $10,102.72:
Detroit Lakes (1939), $16,756.74; Mahnomen (1940), $8,220.
25oSee Keever v. City of Mankato, (1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W.
158, 775; Borwege v. City of Owatonna, (1933) 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W.
915: "When a city engages in activities which are of a nature ordinarily
engaged in by private persons and which subject private persons to liability
for negligence, the city is likewise liable for negligence."
251See Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, (1932)
19 Va. L. Rev. 97, 102.
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similar activities in order to give effect to its consciousness of the
desirability of extending liability. The distinction of our court between street sprinkling and street flushing252 is a striking example.
In spite of the fact that the application of the governmentalproprietary test is difficult to explain and harder to justify,253 the
cases leave no doubt of the fact that the distinction is so firmly
imbedded in precedent that it cannot be pried loose except by legislation. There will undoubtedly be a tendency to expand the classification of proprietary functions whenever hitherto unclassified
activities are before the court for classification. On the other
hand, there is very little likelihood that much change will be
made in the existing classification. Our court has not yet shifted
a single function from one group to the other, although its desire
to limit immunity has led to the adoption of such refinements as
the highly technical distinction between street sprinkling and
street flushing previously mentioned.
In the foregoing discussion no effort has been made to tell
what the Minnesota court has done with particular functions. The
detailed classification adopted by the Minnesota court is discussed
in the following chapters.
E.

THE MINNESOTA

CLASSIFICATION

OF FUNcTIONS:

GOVERNMENTAL

1. POLICE
In operating its police department a municipal corporation
acts in its governmental capacity. Consequently it is not liable for
the wrongful acts of its police officers in making arrests or detaining prisoners,2 5 4 or for an assault by the officer.255 Courts throughout the country almost uniformly take this view.258
2. JAILS
Since lockups and prisons are maintained as part of the function of law enforcement, it is clear that the same immunity should
attach to the keeping of jails as does to the preservation of the
2

52McLeod v. City of Duluth, (1928) 174 firm. 184, 218 N. NV. 892.
0ne writer in despair has said that if there is a guide it must be
the one of--she loves me, 'she loves me not! Freedman, Liability in Tort
of Municipal
Corporations in Missouri, (1938) 3 Mo. L. Rev. 275, 297.
2 54
_ Gullikson v. McDonald, (1895) 62 Minn. 278, 64 N. W. 812.
255
Lamont v. Stavanaugh, (1915) 129 Mfinn. 321, 152 N. W. 720.
2
56See annotations, in 15 L. R. A. 783; 12 L. R. A. (N.S.) 537; 42
A. L. R. (N.S.) 915; and L. R. A. 1915E 460.
25
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public peace. Thus a ,municipal corporation is not liable for negligently maintaining its lockup in an unfit condition as a result of
which a prisoner is injured. 57 This is in line with the general
2
view. 1
3. FIRE PROTECTION
The service required of a fire department "is a public service
for the general welfare of the public" 2 9 and the city or village is
therefore not liable for the acts or misconduct of the department. 26 0 Municipal corporations are now authorized to send their
fire departments outside their corporate limits to fight fires.2 0 1 It
would appear that in doing so they impose no additional liability
on the municipal corporation for their torts; but this matter has
never been determined by our court. Some argument may be
made to the contrary, particularly if a fee is charged for the
service; but the immunity of the city for torts of its fire department is so well established that the court is not likely to depart
2
from the general rule even in such a case. 11
It has been held that the firemen of a city fire department
are not the servants or agents of the person whose property they
attempt to save from fire. Hence their negligence in failing to take
the proper course in the extinguishment of the fire is not imputed to the property owner to defeat his suit for damages resulting when a railway locomotive went over the fire hose and
257Gullikson
v. McDonald, (1895) 62 Minn. 278, 64 N. W. 812.
8
25 See cases annotated in 25 L. R. A. (N.S.)
180 and 52 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 943.
259Grube
v. City of St. Paul, (1886) 34 Minn. 402, 26 N. W. 228.
2
GOGrube v. City of St. Paul, (1886) 34 Minn. 402, 26 N. W. 228;
Miller v. City of Minneapolis, (1898) 75 Minn. 131, 77 N. W. 788;
Erickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (1912) 117 Minn. 348, 135 N. W.
1129; Hillstrom v. City of St. Paul, (1916) 134 Minn. 451, 159 N. W.
1076: Koward v. City of Stillwater, (1929) 171 Minn. 391, 214 N. W. 656.
For cases in other jurisdictions, see annotations in 9 A. L. R. 143, 33
A. L. R. 688 and 84 A. L. R. 514.
2613 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., secs. 1919-1 to 1919-3. Sec.
1919-3 provides that firemen serving outside the municipal limits as atthorized are to be considered as serving in the regular line of duties just as
if serving within the municipality. See Grym v. City of Virginia, (1934) 193
Minn. 62, 257 N. W. 661, holding that a fireman was protected tinder the
workmen's compensation act in attempting a rescue of a man asphyxiated
in a well outside the city limits.
262This seems to be the majority rule elsewhere. Brock-Hall Dairy Co.
v. City of New Haven, (1937) 122 Conn. 321, 189 At. 182; King v. City
of San Angelo, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 66 S.W. (2d) 418; cf. Eulrich v.
Citylof Clintonville, (Wis. 1941) 300 N. W. 219. See, however, City of
Sand Springs v. Gray, (1938) 182 Okla. 248, 77 P. (2d) 56. The question
is briefly discussed in a pamphlet issued by Louisiana State University.
Hyneman and Beckett, Whose Fire Is It, (1939) 13. Cf. Hubert v. Granzow,
(1915) 131 Minn. 361, 154 N. W. 361.
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cut it.263 As a matter of fact, since fire fighting is a governmental

function and the, doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply,
it would seem that if a fire truck is in a collision with another
car and both drivers are negligent, the municipal corporation
should be able to sue the other driver, since the firemen's neglicence cannot be imputed to the city. This has been held in an26
other jurisdiction. 4 '
4. EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
No rule is more consistently applied in the field of tort lia-

bility of political subdivisions of the state than the principle that
municipal corporations (and quasi municipal corporations as
well, although cases of this kind have not arisen as frequently
in which they were defendants) are not liable for failure to exer-

cise or a mistake in exercising their police power and other
"governmental" powers of a similar nature. As a reason for this

view, the immunity of municipalities in the performance of governmental as distinct from proprietary duties or powers is blended
with the notion that there is no liability for the failure to exercise
2 .5
discretionary powers.
In holding municipalities not liable for a failure to exercise
their police power or for a mistaken exercise of that power, the
court has applied the familiar distinction between governmental
and proprietary powers. The exercise of the police power is obviously governmental in character if anything is. Hence there
can be no liability on the municipality in such cases.2 This principle has been applied to the wrongful revocation of a liquor
license,2 67 the rescission of a permit to move a house,208 and the
wrongful denial of a building permit. - 9 It will be noted that in
the last case, the decision could not possibly have been made on
263Erickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (1912)

117 Minn. 348, 135

N. W.
1129.
2

64Paterson v. Erie R. R., (1910) 78 N. J. L. 592, 75 A. 922. As to the
standard of care applied to the driver of a fire truck, see Warren v. Mendenhall,5 (1899) 77 Minn. 145, 79 N. W. 661.
26 5ee Ihk v. Duluth City, (1894) 58 Minn. 182, 59 N. WV.960; Lerch
v. City of Duluth, (1903) 88 Minn. 295, 92 N. W. 1116; Claussen Y. City
of Luverne, (1908)

103 Minn. 491, 115 Minn. 643. 15 L. R. A. (N.S.)

698;2 Roerig v. Houghton, (1919) 144 Minn. 231, 175 N. XV. 542.
- Claussen v. City of Luverne, (1908) 103 Minn.491, 115 N. IV. 643,
15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 698; Roerig v. Houghton, (1919) 144 Minn. 231, 175
N. W. 542; Cf. Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District -(1938)
201 Minn.
622, 277 N. W. 208.
2
67Caussen v. City of Luverne, (1908) 103 Minn. 491, 115 N. XV. 643,
15 L.26R. A. (N.S.) 698.
SLerch v. City of Duluth, (1903) 88 Minn. 295. 92 N. W. 1116.
269
Roerig v. Houghton, (1919) 144 Minn. 231, 175 N. XV. 542.
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the basis of the discretionary-ministerial distinction since the
issuance of a building permit, when legal requirements have been
complied with, is a ministerial act.27 0 On the same principle, the
failure to require a contractor to give a bond for the protection
of materialmen and laborers as required by charter has been
held to give no cause of action against the city. 271 Likewise, in
Lerch v. City of Duluth,272 the court held that a person who leased
a lot on the strength of a permit he had secured from the city
council allowing him to move a frame barn from one place to
another could not recover damages from the city for its void
revocation, the only adequate and appropriate relief being by
injunction to restrain enforcement of the revocation. Here, however, the basis for the decision was at least in part the distinction
between discretionary and ministerial acts. The court said:
"This principle is based upon the dictates of sound public
policy, for within the scope of its proper municipal functions the
governing body of the municipality has committed to it the performance of certain duties which require the exercise of judgment
and discretion, and the city should not be held liable directly as
that no injury would follow from its acts in such
a guarantor
2 71
cases."-

It has been stated in dictum that a municipal corporation is
not liable
"for consequential injuries arising from the bona fide exercise of, or omission to exercise, those powers which are conferred
on its council or legislative body, and the exercise of which as to
the time, extent, and manner is left to the discretion or judgment
of such body. "274

Thus the failure to pass a regulatory ordinance can give rise to
no municipal liability.2 75 The same is true of a failure to enforce
270

Therefore, mandamus, which does not lie to compel the performance

of a discretionary act in a particular way, will lie to compel the issuance
of a building permit. Meyers v. Houghton, (1917) 137 Minn. 481, 163

*N. W. 754.

2711hk v. Duluth City, (1894) 58 Minn. 182, 59 N. W. 960.
272(1903) 88 Minn. 295, 92 N. W. 1116.
273(1903) 88 Minn. 295, 301, 92 N. W. 1116.
2 74
Blyhl v. Village of Waterville, (1894) 57 Minn. 115, 118, 58 N. W.

817.

7

2 5Curran
v. Chicago, Great Western Co., (1916) 134 Minn. 392, 159
N. W. 955. This is to be distinguished from cases where liability has been
imposed when the city has failed to pass an ordinance against street defects
and an accident occurs as the result of such defects. In Bohen v. City of
Waseca, (1884) 32 Minn. 176, 19 N. W. 730, 50 Am. R. 564, the defendant
urged as a reason for immunity the fact that it had not passed an ordinance
for the removal of nuisances such as unsafe awnings over the sidewalk.
The court held, however, that the basis for the liability was the failure of
the city to perform its duty of keeping the streets safe for travel, and thai
the authority to pass ordinances of the kind referred to did not limit the
power of the council to exercise control of the streets.
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it.2 6 Failure to require a bond of a police officer is another
example. No liability on the part of the municipal corporation is
7
occasioned in such a case- -1
In McDoitald v. City of Red Wing,

8

the city was held not

liable for damages sustained by the plaintiff when his house was
destroyed to prevent the spreading of a fire. However, the act

complained of is justifiable even when committed by private
citizens when necessary to prevent spread of a fire and hence cannot be considered a tort.2 7 9 In spite of this fact a number of cities
have written the rule of McDonald v.City of Red Wing into their

charters by providing for ex~mption of the city from liability for
destruction of buildings uhder the direction of designated municipal officials to prevent the spread of fire.2s D
2
7G.See Cook v. Trovatten, (1927) 200 Minn. 221, 274 N. W. 165, an
action based on the alleged failure of the commissioner of agriculture to
enforce the law against unlicensed dealers in produce. Mhile the action wvas
against the individual officer (which was the only remedy worth considering
since he was employed by the state), the same principle would seem to
prevent the successful prosecution of such an action against a municipality
for failure to enforce a local ordinance or resalution. The decisive test of
plaintiff's test was considered to be whether or not she would have been
entitled to mandamus to compel the commissioner to take positive action
"Certainly not," said the court, "because the generality of the language imposing on the commissioner the duty of enforcing the law, to say nothing
of its specific provisions concerning other officers and the law generally
concerning their duties, is such as to leave to the commissioner a large
discretion as to the manner in which, and the agencies by which, the law
is to be enforced against offenders." Idem, p. 224. A municipality has the
same broad discretion in enforcing its ordinances. Hence it has been almost
uniformly held elsewhere that a municipal corporation is not liable for
failure to enforce ordinances which have been enacted. 6 McQuillin, NMunicipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936) sec. 2802, p. 1073 and cases cited in note
29. 277
Lamont v. Stavanaugh, (1915) 129 Minn. 321, 152 N. W. 720.
27-8(1868) 13 Minn. 38 (Gil. 25).
2 79

Restatement of Torts, sec. 196; Hall and Wigmore, Compensation

for Property Destroyed to Prevent Spread of a Conflagration, (1906) 1
Ill. L. Rev. 501, 502. Believing that the sacrificed party should have a
claim against the community for contribution in such a case, Hall and Wigmore proposed a statute based on the common law principle .vhich they
stated thus (p. 515): "Wherever, by reason of a physical danger of loss
impending upon the community or a definable portion thereof, the plaintiff
has been forced to sacrifice his property, and by means of the sacrifice the
impending loss is averted or diminished, the plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed by the community or portion thereof, to the amount of his compulsory sacrifice, less the ratable proportion which would fall upon him as a
member
of the community or portion thereof."
2
8OAda, (1908) sec. 124; Alexandria (1909) sec. 101; Barnesville,
(1898) ch. VIII, sec. 6; Bemidji (1905) ch. V, sec. 19; Breckenridge,
(1907) sec. 122; Cannon Falls, (1905) ch. XI, sec. 7; Dawson, (1911) ch.
13, sec. 6; Detroit Lakes, (1903) sec. 113; Fergus Falls, (1903) sec. 116;
Glencoe, (1909) ch. VIII, sec. 7; Granite Falls, (1936) sec. 66; Hutchinson,
(1913) ch. IX, sec. 7; International Falls, (1910) ch. IX, sec. 7; Jackson,
(1920) sec. 105; Lake City, (1909) ch. VI, sec. 5; Montevideo, (1930) sec.
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5. PARKS AND RECREATION

Courts have experienced considerable difficulty in classifying
parks and recreational activities for purposes of determining
liability in tort. Decisions have been sharply divided, with the
majority of the courts in favor of immunity. 28' The Minnesota
court has consistently held that a city maintains its parks in its
governmental capacity and is therefore not subject to liability for
damages from its negligence in maintaining them.2 8 2 For this
purpose the term "parks" includes such recreational facilities as

slides, 2 3 bathing beaches, 2 84 and hockey rinks.285 A school district is likewise exempt from liability for negligence in maintaining its playgrounds 28 6 and operating its recreational program.28 1
It makes no difference that a charge is made for attendance at
football games conducted by a school district2 8 or for a bathing
suit and other facilities at a municipal bathing beach.2819 There is
no indication in the latter cases whether the amount of the charge
would have any effect on liability; but if it were large enough to
insure operation of the activity at a profit, there is reason to
believe from cases applying the profit test 20 0 that the immunity
would be lost. It could hardly be said then to be operated for the
good of all without corporate advantage.
In St. John v. City of St. Paul,29 ' the court implies that had
56; Moorhead, (1900) sec. -122; Ortonville, (1928) sec. 152; Red Wing,
(1902) ch. VI, sec. 16; Renville, (1906) ch. VIII, sec. 7; St. James, (1918)
sec. 100; Staples, (1908) sec. 110; Two Harbors, (1907) ch. IX, sec. 7;
Virginia, (1909) sec. 184; Warren, (1914) ch. VI, sec. 6; Willmar, (1901)
sec. 119; Windom, (1920) sec. 117; Winthrop (1907) ch. 10, sec. 7;
(1909) sec. 108. Cf. White Bear Lake, (1922) sec. 131.
Worthington,
28
Schroeder, Municipal Liability to Individuals for Nonfeasance in the
Operation of Parks, (1911) 59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 400; Stern, Tort Liability
for Injuries Received in Parks and Playgrounds, (1936) 14 N. C. L. Rev.
388; see annotations in 29 A. L. R. 863, 42 A. L. R. 263, and 99 A. L. R.
686. 282
Emmons v. City of Virginia, (1922) 152 Minn. 295, 188 N. W. 561;
St. John v. City of St. Paul, (1929) 179 Minn. 12, 228 N. W. 170; Howard
v. Village of Chisholm, (1934) 191 Minn. 245, 253 N. W. 766.
v. City of Virginia, (1922) 152 Minn. 295, 188 N. W. 561.
283Emmons
2 84
St. John v. City of St. Paul, (1929)
2 5

179 Minn. 12, 228 N. W. 170.

8 Howard v. Village of Chisholm, (1934) 191 Minn. 245, 253 N. W.

766. 2
8OBank v. Brainerd School District, (1892) 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W. 814.
2s7Mokovich v. Independent School District No. 22, (1929) 177 Minn.
446, 225 N. W. 292.
288(1929) 177 Minn. 446, 225 N. W. 292.
2 89
St. John v. City of St. Paul, (1929) 179 Minn. 12, 228 N. W. 170.
29

oSupra, note 240.
291(1922) 179 Minn. 12, 228 N. W. 170. A recent case note on this case
may be found in (1930) 5 Notre Dame Lawyer 342; see also (1936) 34
Mich. L. Rev. 1250.
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the plaintiff received injury from the rented bathing suit or towel
because the city had negligently allowed them to become carriers
of disease rather than from a diving tower, allegedly maintained,
as was the case, the city would have been liable on the analogy of
the cases29 - holding a municipal corporation liable for torts
committed. in the operation of a utility being operated for profit.
The implication of the dictum seems to be that one function may
be proprietary and governmental as to the same person. If that is
true, the principle applied in negligence cases in connection with
park injuries must be restated somewhat as follows: There is no
liability for negligence in the maintenance of parks and playgrounds by a municipality unless a charge is made for any of the
services. If such a charge is made, the municipality is liable for
all negligence directly associated with the service charged for,
but not for negligence in the maintenance of other facilities which
are furnished regardless of payment of the fee. Thus if a man
pays for the rental of a bathing suit, he may recover from the
municipality furnishing it if he suffers damage from the unsanitary condition of the suit; but he may not recover if he is injured in such a case by the defective condition of a diving tower.
If this dictum were to be followed, it might be the first step toward
complete abrogation of the immunity doctrine in park cases, which
is clearly the trend of recent decisions elsewhere. 9 3
All municipal corporations in Minnesota are authorized by
statute to acquire and maintain tourist camps. 2g' Whether or not
this function would be classed for purposes of tort liability along
with parks and recreation is an open question in this state, as it
is generally throughout the country.2 9 5
6. HEALTHa
In performing its duties for the care and preservation of
public health, a city is acting in its governmental character. Hence
292
Keever v. City of Mankato, (1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. '%V. 158,
775, 33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 339, Ann. Cas. 1912A 216; Brantman v. City of
Canby, (1912) 119 Minn. 396, 138 N. 'W. 671, 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 862.

The 29Keever Case involved death from polluted municipal water.
31fcQuillin ventures the prediction that "the rule will ultimately prevail that in maintaining parks, playgrounds and like recreations, the city
is performing a local function for its people and it should be held liable
on the same basis as a private person or corporation." 6 McQuillin, Mfunicipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936) sec. 2850, p. 1192.
2941 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1933-9.
29 5
Cf. Kennedy v. Nevada, (1926) 222 Mo. App. 459, 281 S. V. 56,
holding the city not liable where the acquisition of a tourist park was
ultra vires.
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it is not liable for its negligence in this regard.20 0 This conception

of health as a governmental function is responsible for the immunity of municipal corporations from the consequences of their
negligence in sprinkling streets23 7 and maintaining a garbage
dump ground..29 There has been no suggestion of what would be
the effect in the latter case if a service charge were imposed to
cover the cost of refuse removal, not an unusual practice. Other
courts have been divided on these propositions, the majority
holding that street sprinkling and garbage removal are govern2 9

mental functions.

7. CITY HALL

Snider v. City of St. Paul10 0 presented the court with an opportunity to decide whether a city was answerable for its negligence in maintaining a city hall. The plaintiff had been injured
through the alleged negligent operation of a city hall elevator.
The court held, however, that she could not recover because the
maintenance of a city hall is a governmental purpose and the
city derives no revenue from it. The same rule had previously
been applied to counties.301
The question of the effect on the application of this rule of
the fact that the city operates utilities whose offices are housed in
the city hall has never been presented to the Minnesota court. As
is shown later,"0 2 this problem has proved puzzling in some
jurisdictions.
8. STREET LIGHTING

In view of the fact that a municipal corporation is not ordinarily liable for the failure to undertake an authorized activity,
the court has several times held that a city is under no obligation
to light its streets. Its mere neglect to do so is not a ground of
liability, unless the charter expressly imposes the duty.303 How29
6Bryant v. City of St. Paul, (1885) 33 Minn. 289, 23 N. W. 220.
Maintaining a park is a governmental activity because it is done "in the
interest of public health and welfare." St. John v. City of St. Paul, (1929)
179 Minn.
12, 288 N. W. 170.
-97 Cf. McLeod v. City of Duluth, (1928) 174 Minn, 184, 218 N. W. 892.
29sDehanitz v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 73 Minn. 385, 76 N. W. 48,
2996 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928, rev. 1936) sec.
2807; see annotations in 14 A. L. R. 1473, 32 A. L. R. 988; 52 A. L. R
187, 60 A. L. R. 101. This is also true as to the maintenance of rubbish
dumps. See annotation in 63 A. L. R. 332.

300(1892) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763.
301
Dosdall v.
302
Infra, text
3

County of Olmsted, (1882) 30 Minn. 96, 14 N. W. 458.
at footnotes 676-682.
3o Miller v. City of St. Paul, (1888) 38 Minn. 134, 36 N. W. 271;
McHugh v. City of St. Paul, (1897) 67 Minn. 441, 70 N. W. 5; Freeman
v. Village of Hibbing, (1926) 169 Minn. 353, 211 N. W. 819.
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ever, this rule need not rest on any classification of street lighting
as a governmental function, but on the principle that a municipal
corporation is not- liable for a failure to exercise a discretionary
power.30 After that principle was established, the question still
remained whether a municipal corporation was liable for negligence in lighting its streets, once it undertook to perform the
service. The problem was presented to the court in Bojko v,
City of Minneapolis,305 where the plaintiff claimed damages for
an assault alleged to have been traceable to the city's inadequate
street lighting system. Without discussing the relation of the poor
street lighting to the injury, the court held flatly that illumination of streets involved the exercise of a governmental power and
that consequently the city could not be held liable for negligence
in performing this function.30 6
9. LIBRARIES

Every city and village in the state has statutory authority to
establish and maintain a library and to levy a tax for its support.30 7 Liability of a municipality for the operation of such a
library has never been determined in Minnesota,30 s but it seems
likely that the maintenance of a library would be held to be governmental in character. Whether its objective is considered the
furnishing of education, recreation, 'or both, the analogies point
to immunity,309 since the carrying on of recreational programs
by municipal corporations and educational programs by school
districts have both been held to result in no liability to the municipality furnishing them. Libraries uniformly provide free services
to all residents of the municipality. Hence if the profit test is to
be applied there should be no liability; and the fact that incidental
charges are made for overdue books and for other delinquencies
30

See supra, p. 296.
305(1923) 154 Minn. 167, 191 N. W. 399.
306
1nadequate street lighting does not necessarily involve a breach of

the duty to keep streets in good repair; but evidently if a street partially out

of repair may be reasonably safe for travel if lighted but dangerous if un-

lighted, the fact that it was or was not lighted may be material upon the
question of negligence in maintaining the street. Miller v. City of St. Paul,
(1888) 38 Minn. 134, 36 N. W. 271.

3071 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., secs. 5661 to 5669.
3 08
s n one case the Minneapolis library board was held liable for
loss of a rare coin exhibit lent to it. Smith v. Library Board of Minneapolis,
(1894) 58 Minn. 108, 59 N. W. 979; 25 L. R. A. 280. The case is not,
however, a precedent on the question of tort liability.
30
9See, however, Johnson v. City of Chicago, (1913) 258 Ill. 494, 101
N. E. 960, 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1167. Cf. La. Marca v. Brooklyn Public
Library, (1939) 256 App. Div. 954, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 129.
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should have no effect on liability if the activity is otherwise to be
classified as governmental. 310
School districts also maintain libraries. While there have been
no cases involving the liability of school districts for negligence
in the maintenance of their libraries, the implication of the many
general statements in the cases3 1' to the effect that school districts
perform only governmental functions is that the general inimunity of school districts from liability for their negligence extends to this activity. With the school district not liable for negligence in the operation of its library facilities, difficult questions
might arise were the court to hold that municipal corporations
carry on proprietary functions in operating their libraries. The
statutes appear to contemplate agreements between cities and
villages on the one hand and school districts on the other for the
maintenance of joint libraries. 312 If a joint library were established, would there be liability for negligence in its operation?
Or would liability depend on whether the library was maintained
in the school building or the municipal hall?
10. EDUCATION

The function of education, entrusted in this state almost entirely to school districts constituted independently of municipal
government, is clearly governmental in character. Hence its negligent performance will occasion no liability to the school district,""3
Since the immunity seems to rest more on the character of the
duty of education than on the quasi-corporate status of the agency which performs that duty, it seems clear that this freedom
from liability extends to a municipal corporation, 14 which performs for its community the function of education. For purposes
of tort liability, the transporting of pupils to and from school in
busses is part of the function of education.313
31OMokovich v. Independent School District No. 22, (1929) 177 Minn.
446, 225 N. W. 292; St. John v. City of St. Paul, (1929) 179 Minn. 12,
228 N. W. 170.
31"See the section on school district liability, supra, p. 323.
312l Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 3020.
313
Bank v. Brainerd School District, (1892) 49 Minn. 106, 51 N. W.
814; Allen v. Independent School District No. 17, (1927) 173 Minn. 5, 216

N. W. 533. See Rosenfield, Governmental Immunity from Liability for Tort

in School Accidents, (1940) 5 Legal Notes on Local Gov't 358; Seitz,
School District Responsibility for Negligent Supervision of Pupils, (1941)
25 Marquette L. Rev. 115.
314
St. Paul, for example.

8'SAllen v. Independent School District, (1927) 173 Minn. 5, 216 N. W.
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F. THE MINNESOTA CLASSIFICATION

OF FuNcTIoNs:

PROPRIETARY
1. UTILITIES

Perhaps there is no municipal function more uniformly classified for purposes of tort liability than municipally-operated utilities. Practically without exception courts have considered these
enterprises proprietary.3 16 In Minnesota this principle has been
established as to electric and gas plants, 31 water works,318 and
telephone systems.3 19 Liability has frequently been imposed upon
municipalities for their torts committed in the operation of pub20
licly-owned utilities without mention of the principle involved.3
'The underlying reason for classifying these ventures as proprietary appears to be that they are commercial, ordinarily being
performed by private agencies for profit. In Brantynan v.City of
Canby,312 the test adopted for determining liability is whether
or not the municipality has authority to grant a franchise to anyone to perform a function whihh it may perform itself.
"In this state a city in maintaining a board of health, a police
or fire department, discharges a governmental function pure and
simple; and we believe as to these or similar functions, it has no
power to escape the burden imposed by granting a franchise to
anyone to perform in its place. But as to furnishing water, light,
etc., for private consumers and public purposes combined, the
furnishing of which is not imposed by law as a governmental
duty, the city, if it undertakes to do so assumes a position to
3166 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928, rev. 1936) sec.

2852; see annotations in 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 536; 43 L. R. A. (N.S.) 862;
L. R. A. 1915E 316; 24 A. L. R. 545, 28 A. L. R. 822, and 54 A. L. R.
1497; 5 A. L. R. 1402, 13 A. L. R. 1132, and 61 A. L. R. 452; 31 A. L. R.
1306.
31Brantman v. City of Canby, (1912) 119 Minn. 396, 138 Minn. 671.
31
SKeever v. City of Mankato, (1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. NV. 158,
775. See also Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, (1906) 99 Minn. 255, 109 N. W.
114. The case of K.eever v. City of Mankato involved injury from polluted
water. Generally it is not held, howe'ver, that there is an implied warranty
of purity when a city distributes water to its inhabitants, but there is authority to the contrary. See (1919) 4 MINNESOTA LAw REvmw 74,
(1921) 5 MINE SoTA LAW RmEvw 326.
3lsStorti v. Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
3-°Megins v. City of Duluth, (1906) 97 Minn. 23, 106 N. W. 89;
Diamond Iron Works v. City of Minneapolis, (1915) 129 Minn. 267. 152
N. W. 647; Frasch v. City of New Ulm, (1915) 130 Minn. 41, 153 N. V.
121; Goar v. Village of Stephen, (1923) 157 Minn. 228, 196 N. W. 171;
Fitch v. City of Blue Earth, (1930) 180 Minn. 125, 230 N. W. 469;
Theisen v. Minnesota Power and Light Co., (1937) 200 Minn. S15, 274
N. W. 617. Liability was imposed without proof of negligence in WViltse v.
City of Red Wing, (1906) 99 Minn. 255, 109 N. W. 114 and BridgemanRussell Company v. City of Duluth, (1924) 158 Minn. 509, 197 N. AV. 971.
321(1912) 119 Minn. 396, 138 N. W. 671.
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those injured through its negligence therein which is not different
from what would be the position of'322one to whom it had granted
the right to furnish water or light.

While emphasis has been placed on the fact that a city in
conducting a utility is in a profit-making business,3 2

there is

nothing to suggest that the utility must actually make a profit
before liability is imposed. Many of the cities and villages of the
state operate their waterworks at cost and in a number of cases
subsidize these enterprises by tax levies. 3 24 This fact does not
militate against liability. It is enough that the utility is furnished
only to those who have the necessary facilities installed in their
3 2
homes or places of business and pay the prescribed rates. 5
2.

HOSPITALS

Only one Minnesota case, Borwege v. City of Owatonna,320
has involved the liability of a municipal corporation for negligence in the operation of a publicly-owned hospital. The plaintiff
had been burned by a hot water bottle negligently left in his
bed after an appendectomy. Judgment for him was affirmed, but
it is not clear from the opinion that all municipally-owned hospitals would be subjected to similar liability for their negligence.
The court strongly emphasized the fact that the practice was to
charge for services rendered. Nonpay patients were not knowingly received; charity patients of the county were paid for by
the county board. The plaintiff was a pay patient. Thus "under
the circumstances," the city was exercising its proprietary powers
in operating the hospital. "It was a general hospital operated for
the private advantage and convenience of the inhabitants of the
32
city." 7

The court was not impressed with the defendant's argument that
the hospital was for the preservation of health, an established governmental function. The main purpose of the hospital
"was to care for and cure individual cases, which is the function of any hospital, whether it be a city hospital or a private
322(1912) 119 Minn. 396, 398, 138 N. W. 671. Cf. City of East Grand
Forks v. Luck (1906) 97 Minn. 373, 107 N. W. 393, 7 Ann, Cas. 1015; 6
L. R.323A. (N.S.) 198.
Keever v. City of Mankato, (1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158,
775. See
2 also Storti v. Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
3 4Specific statutory authority is given to every village with a utility
commission to levy a special five-mill tax for the support of the utilities.
I Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats. sec. 1245.
325Storti v. Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
326(1933) 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915.
2-27(1933) 190 Minn. 394, 395, 251 N. W. 915.
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hospital. When a city engages in activities which are of a nature
ordinarily engaged in by private persons and which subject private
persons to liability for negligence, the city is likewise liable for
negligence." 328
The clear implication of the decision appears to be that a
municipality would not be liable for the negligence of hospital
employees if the hospital were maintained solely for the protection
of society from disease. It would probably be engaging in a governmental function if it operated a sanatorium for consumptives,
for example. On the other hand, the fact that a municipally-operated hospital took only charity patients presumably would not relieve it from liability. It would be subject to the same responsibility
for negligence as a private hospital; and in this state owners of such
hospitals are liable for the negligence of their servants whether the
hospital be maintained for profit of the owners or for charitable
purposes.329
3. LIQUOR DISPENSARIES
'The state liquor law 330 authorizes cities of the fourth class and
villages, in lieu of licensing private sales, to sell intoxicating liquor
through municipal stores.3 3 ' Pursuant to this authorization, 170
cities and villages have established and are now operating municipal liquor dispensaries. 332 However, no case has yet reached the
supreme court involving the liability of municipal corporations for
damages from negligence in the operation of this new municipal
activity. Since there appears to be little authority elsewhere for
cities and villages to go into the liquor business, the question has
not arisen in other states either.
It seems likely, however, that the court will hold that a municipal corporation is carrying on a proprietary function in operating
a liquor dispensary and therefore is liable for damages resulting
from the negligence of its employees in conducting the business.
With the stores almost without exception making a profit, the test
328(1933) 190 Minn. 394, 396, 251 N. W. 915. See recent case notes.
(1924)29 24 Col. L. Rev. 679.
- Mullinek v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein (1924) 144 Minn.
392, 175 N. W. 699. Cf. the recent case of Volk v. City of New York,
(1940) 284 N. Y. 279, 30 N. E. 596, drawing a distinction between charity
and 33O
pay patients with respect to municipal tort liability.
Minnesota, Laws Ex. Sess. 1933-34, ch. 46; 3 Mason's 1927 Minn.
1940 Supp., sec. 3200-21 ff.
Stats.,
33
'Idem. sec. 3200-21, 3200-25. These stores are prohibited in the 25
"dry" counties of the state. Idem sec. 3200-30. Virtually special laws permit
their establishment in Ottertail and Norman Counties, otherwise classified as
"dry" 32counties. Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 395; 1941, ch. 401.
The Municipal Liquor Store, July, 1940, p. 9. Several other stores
have been established since that date.
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of Keever v. City of M4lankato" 3 that an enterprise is proprietary
when it is profit-making in the sense that when conducted by
private persons it is operated for profit would require such a
holding. The court has pointed out that a city may escape the
burden of furnishing water and light by granting a franchise to
perform in its place. 33 4 Likewise, a municipality may license the
sale of intoxicating liquor in private stores instead of selling it
itself.
It is true that the purpose in establishing a liquor store is to
control the liquor traffic ;33' but as has been mentioned earlier, the
Minnesota court has considered the presence of profit, or profitmaking possibilities, so conclusive,of the proprietary nature of an
activity, that there can be little doubt that municipalities in operating a liquor dispensary are subject to the same principles as
private licensees insofar as liability for negligence is concerned. 3 10
Perhaps a more difficult question is whether or not the municipal corporation may be subject to liability in favor of a person
injured by the intoxication of a purchaser of liquor from the
municipal store. There is no cause of action in such case at common law, 37 but by statute38 one who sells liquor to a person not
entitled to purchase it (a minor, for example) is liable to one
"injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person." 3 0
This "civil damage statute" applies to the employer as well
as to the employee who actually makes the sale.840 The difficult
question, however, is whether or not the "person" to whom the
113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158.
v. City of Canby, (1912) 119 Minn. 396, 138 N. W. 671.
The cases upholding the constitutionality of state statutes providing
for the sale of intoxicating liquors by the state or a state agency proceed
generally on the theory that the state in making this provision for the sale
of liquor is exercising its police power in behalf of public health, morals,
and 3welfare.
See annotation in 121 A. L. R. 300.
36
The attorney general has reached this conclusion. Op. A. G. July 25,
1934.
337Sworski v. Colman, (1939) 204 Minn. 474, 283 N. W. 778.
a,98
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 3239.
33
9The statute is still in force even though it was passed before the
eighteenth amendment. It has been applied since repeal. Sworski v. Colman,
(1939) 204 Minn. 474, 283 N. W. 778, and during the period of prohibition,
Benes v. Campion, (1932) 186 Minn. 578, 244 N. W. 72. It is not necessary that the intoxication be the proximate cause of the injury. Sworski v.
Colman, (1940) 208 Minn. 43, 293 N. W. 297.
34
oSee State v. Sobelman, (1937) 199 Minn. 232, 271 N. W. 484;
State v. Holm, (1937) 201 Minn. 53, 275 N. W. 401; 3 Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stats., 1940, Supp., sec. 3238-16Y. It may apply to "off-sales"--sales for
consumption off the premises-as well as to "on-sales"--sales for consumption on the premises. State v. Holm, supra, this note.
333(1910)
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statute applies, includes municipal corporations. There is the general rule that statutes are not applicable to the state or its subdivisions unless the intent to make them applicable is clearly
indicated. Thus, for example, the word "corporation" ordinarily
is construed as not embracing municipal corporations. 34' On the
other hand the use of the term "corporation" in the wrongful death
statute has been held by the Minnesota court to embrace municipal
corporations.14 2 Furthermore, the law under which cities and
villages are permitted to establish liquor dispensaries343 includes
in the meaning of the term "person" the meaning extended to it
by Mason's 1927 Minnesota Statutes, sec. 10933. That section, at
paragraph 11, permits the application of the word "person" to
"bodies politic and corporate" in addition to partnerships and
other unincorporated associations. 34" While it is still an open question in this state, it appears quite possible that a court would hold
that a municipal corporation engaging in the retail liquor business
would be subject to civil liability to the same extent as private
liquor dealers for their wrongful actions, both common law torts
and statutory wrongs.
4. TOLL BIDGES

The city of Winona once built a toll bridge over the Mississippi
River. It authorized a power company to string its lines over the
bridge from its Wisconsin power plant. Later a painter with whom
the city contracted to paint the bridge was killed by a brush discharge due to the negligence of the power company and the city.
The city was held liable for wrongful death because "the bridge
was the private property of the city, and held, owned, and maintained in its proprietary capacity."3 45 While the proprietary nature
of the undertaking appeared to be clearly established in the court's
mind, it was pointed out that the same result would have been
reached had the bridge been considered as a quasi-public highway, in which case, the rule imposing liability upon municipal
corporations for defective streets would have been invoked. There
is therefore no essential difference in liability between municipal
free bridges and toll bridges. Both are portions of the highway.
341
See the many cases cited under the title "corporations" in Words
and Phrases.
2
&V.
88;
34 Maylone v. City of St. Paul, (1889) 40 Minn. 406, 42 N.
Orth v. Village of Belgrade, (1902) 87 Minn. 237, 91 N. W. 843; Keever v.
City of Mankato, (1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158, 775.
3433 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sec. 3200-21.
344
Howver, the civil damage statute is not a part of the 1934 liquor act.
34
5Hoppe v. City of Winona, (1911) 113 Minn. 252, 129 N. V. 577.
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5. AIRPORTS

At least a score of cities and villages in Minnesota own and
operate airports, 34 6 and many of them have done so for a number
of year . Yet the airport function has not yet been classified in
this state for purposes of tort liability. Elsewhere it has been
generally held that a municipality operates an airport in its proprietary capacity and is liable for damages resulting from its negligence in such operation.117 In view of the virtual unanimity of the
courts and considering the judicial tendency to classify previously
unclassified activities as proprietary, the likely attitude of the
Minnesota court would seem to favor the subjection of municipal
corporations to tort liability in their operation of airports.
(To be Continued)
346
3 7Minnesota

Year Book, 1939, p. 191.
4 Coleman v. Oakland, (1930) 110 Cal. App. 715, 295 Pac. 59, 1931
U. S. Aviation Rev. 61; Pignet v. City of Santa Monica, (1938) 29 Cal.
App. 286, 84 P. (2d) 166; Mobile v. Lartigue, (1930) 23 Ala. App. 479,
127 So. 257, 1931 U. S. Aviation Rev. 50; Mollencop v. Salem, (1932) 139
Or. 137, 8 P. (2d) 783, 83 A. L. R. 315, City of Blackwell v. Lee, (1936)
178 Okla. 338, 62 P. (2d) 1219; Christopher v. City of El Paso (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936) 98 S. W. (2d) 394. In Tennessee a contrary rules applies, but
this is by virtue of a statute exempting the municipality from liability.
Stocker v. City of Nashville, (1939) 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S. W. (2d) 339.
Recently, the Iowa court has held that a municipal corporation operates an
airport in its governmental capacity. Abbott v. City of Des Moines, (Iowa,
1941) 298 N. W. 649.

